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ATTACKING INNOVATION
XUAN-THAO NGUYEN & JEFFREY A. MAINE

ABSTRACT
Economists generally agree that innovation is important to economic growth
and that government support for innovation is necessary. Historically, the U.S.
government has supported innovation in a variety of ways: (1) a strong legal
system for patents; (2) direct support through research performed by
government agencies, grants, loans, and loan guarantees; and (3) indirect
support through various tax incentives for private firms. In recent years,
however, we have seen a weakening of the U.S. patent system, a decline in direct
funding of research, and a weakening of tax policy tools used to encourage new
innovation. These disruptive changes threaten the future of innovation in the
United States, potentially driving innovation activities offshore to Europe and
China. This Article concludes that the current innovation crisis demands
changes to both the patent and tax systems in order to instill confidence in the
innovation landscape.
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INTRODUCTION
Twelve years ago, there were about 700,000 new start-up firms every year in
the United States, according to the Ewing Marion Kaufman Foundation, but that
number has fallen 30% to 500,000 firms and continues downwards. 1 In a study
conducted by the Chronicle of Higher Education, more than half of the 11,000
researchers surveyed across the nation had abandoned projects central to their
labs due to economic pressure.2 In the study entitled The Future Postponed, MIT
delivered a shocking list revealing that none of the notable scientific highlights
in recent years were U.S.-led achievements. 3 The data confirms a new reality
that not many care to acknowledge: innovation in the United States is
dwindling.4 Several key reasons for this dire situation stem from the multiple
and pervasive attacks on innovation. Most startlingly, the attacks are often in
disguise as benefiting innovation.5 As a result, there has been an almost universal

1
Carl J. Schramm, Professor at Syracuse Univ., Former President, Ewing Marion
Kaufman Found. for Entrepreneurship, and Bd. Member, IIPCC, Presentation at International
IP Commercialization Council Program on Promoting Innovation, Investment and Job
Growth by Fixing America’s Patent System: Entrepreneurship, IP and the Benefits to the U.S.
Economy 6-7 (May 8, 2017) (transcript available at https://www.dropbox.com/sh
/qnz1q7jtr32gtz5/AADP7ROru1xhneHIrsu9Zlqla?dl=0&preview=IIPCC+WDC+May+8+2
017+-+Prof+Carl+Schramm+Presentation+Transcript.PDF
[https://perma.cc/7Y5ATRNL]); see also Jane Wollman Rusoff, ‘Burn the Business Plan’ When Starting Your Own
(Mar.
1,
2018,
10:29
AM),
Firm:
Carl
Schramm,
THINKADVISOR
https://www.thinkadvisor.com/2018/03/01/burn-the-business-plan-when-starting-your-ownfirm/ [https://perma.cc/GMB7-4QFQ] (“Twenty years ago the U.S. was benefiting from one
1 million startups a year. Ten years ago it was about 700,000 a year. This year there will be
fewer than 500,000 startups.”).
2
Paul Basken & Paul Voosen, Strapped Scientists Abandon Research and Students,
CHRON. HIGHER EDUC. (Feb. 24, 2014), https://www.chronicle.com/article/StrappedScientists-Abandon/144921 (“Nearly half [of survey respondents] have already abandoned an
area of investigation they considered central to their lab’s mission.”).
3
MIT COMM. TO EVALUATE THE INNOVATION DEFICIT, THE FUTURE POSTPONED: WHY
DECLINING INVESTMENT IN BASIC RESEARCH THREATENS A U.S. INNOVATION DEFICIT, at v
(2015), https://dc.mit.edu/sites/default/files/Future%20Postponed.pdf [https://perma.cc
/L6LZ-5NSP] (listing achievements such as “discovery of a new fundamental particle” and
“development of the world’s fastest supercomputer”).
4
MIT has documented the innovation crisis by providing tangible examples of:
under-exploited areas of science and likely consequences in the form of an innovation
deficit, including: opportunities with high potential for big payoffs in health, energy, and
high-tech industries; fields where we risk falling behind in critical strategic capabilities
such as supercomputing, secure information systems, and national defense technologies;
areas where national prestige is at stake, such as space exploration, or where a lack of
specialized U.S research facilities is driving key scientific talent to work overseas.
Id. at v-vi.
5
See Charles Duhigg & Steve Lohr, The Patent, Used As a Sword, N.Y. TIMES, Oct. 8,
2012, at A1; James Bessen, The Evidence Is In: Patent Trolls Do Hurt Innovation, HARV.
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silence in legal scholarship on how law and policy have discouraged innovation,
which has led to the current innovation crisis. This Article breaks that silence.
First, there has been a fierce attack in patent law, where strong patents were
once considered incentives for innovation.6 The attack on the patent system
cloaked itself in the hysterical “patent troll” narrative that patent owners behave
like trolls to extort innovative companies,7 without any consideration of the fact
that these infringers are using others’ patented technologies without
BUS. REV. (Nov. 2014), https://hbr.org/2014/07/the-evidence-is-in-patent-trolls-do-hurtinnovation [https://perma.cc/T7MT-44TG] (calling for change to patent law to address patent
trolls); Larry Downes, The U.S. Supreme Court Is Reining in Patent Trolls, Which Is a Win
for Innovation, HARV. BUS. REV. (June 2, 2017), https://hbr.org/2017/06/the-u-s-supremecourt-is-reining-in-patent-trolls-which-is-a-win-for-innovation
[https://perma.cc/L7YHBUPS] (arguing that recent changes to law “will improve the innovation environment for
companies in fast-changing industries”); Patents, ELECTRONIC FRONTIER FOUND.,
https://www.eff.org/patent [https://perma.cc/K8DB-CQ8S] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019);
Richard A. Posner, Why There Are Too Many Patents in America, ATLANTIC (July 12, 2012),
https://www.theatlantic.com/business/archive/2012/07/why-there-are-too-many-patents-inamerica/259725 [https://perma.cc/CEY8-YX3V]; Gene Sperling, Taking on Patent Trolls to
Protect American Innovation, WHITE HOUSE (June 4, 2013, 1:55 PM),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/blog/2013/06/04/taking-patent-trolls-protect-americaninnovation [https://perma.cc/77YS-HHXS].
6
Some have called for the abolishment of the patent system. See generally MICHELE
BOLDRIN & DAVID K. LEVINE, AGAINST INTELLECTUAL MONOPOLY (2008) (questioning
whether legal intellectual property regime achieves intended purpose of creating incentives
for innovation); ADAM B. JAFFE & JOSH LERNER, INNOVATION AND ITS DISCONTENTS: HOW
OUR BROKEN PATENT SYSTEM IS ENDANGERING INNOVATION AND PROGRESS, AND WHAT TO
DO ABOUT IT, at xi (2004) (suggesting that current patent policy and practice is generating
seriously negative consequences for inventors).
7
The hysteria continues to persist in academia and the media. See, e.g., Eduardo Porter,
Patent ‘Trolls’ May Be Poised For Comeback, N.Y. TIMES, Nov. 22, 2017, at B1 (“Companies
no longer have to pay ransom so the threat of lawsuits over dubious royalty payments—filed
by aggressive litigants known as trolls—will go away.”); see also Peter Detkin, Founder,
Intellectual Ventures, Remarks at 12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute: The Current
Patent Landscape in the U.S. and Abroad 45 (Mar. 9-10, 2017) (transcript available at
https://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2017/04/The-Current-PatentLandscape-in-the-U.S.-and-Abroad-FINAL-TRANSCRIPT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3P8KUBQF]) (“[I]n 10 years of patent law debates about how the system needs to be changed,
there’s a lot of hysteria and a lot of stories, but very little data. I think it’s very important for
those who are the policymakers in the room . . . that you rely on data, not anecdotes when
considering what changes should be made.”). In fact, the patent system today is akin to a bank
robber who cries victimization when he is caught. See Damon C. Matteo, Chief Exec. Officer,
Fulcrum Strategy, Remarks at 12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute: The Current
Patent Landscape in the U.S. and Abroad 29 (Mar. 9-10, 2017) (transcript available at
https://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wp-content/uploads/sites/31/2017/04/The-Current-PatentLandscape-in-the-U.S.-and-Abroad-FINAL-TRANSCRIPT.pdf
[https://perma.cc/3P8KUBQF]).
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reciprocating compensation.8 Heeding the hysteria, the Supreme Court and the
2013 America Invents Act (“AIA”) Patent Trial and Appeal Board (“PTAB”)
have become forerunners in creating a weak and uncertain patent system.9
Innovations are deemed ordinary, or not worthy of receiving legal protection, 10
or just simply categorically ineligible for patent protection.11 This has resulted
in important sectors of the economy shutting down.12 Furthermore, without

8

The Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) released a study in 2016, conducted between
January 2009 and mid-September 2014, that attempted to temper the hysteria with real data
and analysis of twenty-two patent assertion entity respondents and more than 2500 affiliates
and related entities. See FTC, PATENT ASSERTION ENTITY ACTIVITY 2-3 (2016). The FTC
concluded that “a label like ‘patent troll’ is unhelpful because it invites pre-judgement about
the societal impact of patent assertion activity without an understanding of the underlying
business model that fuels such activity.” Id. at 17.
9
See Robert Greene Sterne, Attorney, Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox P.L.L.C., Remarks
at 12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute: The Current Patent Landscape in the U.S. and
Abroad 40-41 (Mar. 9-10, 2017) (transcript available at https://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wpcontent/uploads/sites/31/2017/04/The-Current-Patent-Landscape-in-the-U.S.-and-AbroadFINAL-TRANSCRIPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P8K-UBQF]) (suggesting PTAB generated
weakness and uncertainty of current patent system).
10
KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 402, 427 (2007) (finding that “[g]ranting
patent protection to advances that would occur in the ordinary course without real innovation
retards progress” and that “ordinary innovation [is] not the subject of exclusive rights under
the patent laws”); Michael Abramowicz & John F. Duffy, The Inducement Standard of
Patentability, 120 YALE L.J. 1590, 1608 (2010) (rejecting cognitive approach to doctrine of
obviousness because “cognition is an epistemic phenomenon that takes place at a particular
moment in time while invention occurs across time”); Gregory Mandel, The Non-Obvious
Problem: How the Indeterminate Nonobviousness Standard Produces Excessive Patent
Grants, 42 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 57, 120-21 (2008) (observing that KSR International’s
dichotomy of real versus ordinary innovations ignores psychological evidence that
“creativity is believed to vary along a continuum”).
11
See Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l, 573 U.S. 208, 212 (2014) (“[C]omputer
implementation [of an abstract idea] fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible
invention.”); Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576, 596
(2013) (holding isolation of genes patent ineligible); Mayo Collaborative Servs. v.
Prometheus Labs., Inc., 566 U.S. 66, 72 (2012) (holding recitation of law of nature ineligible
for patent protection). Post-Alice, -Mayo, and -Myriad, the Federal Circuit applied the
Supreme Court’s new interpretations and found only three out of thirty cases patent eligible
in areas other than biology. See Michael A. Sanzo, Lengthening Shadows: Biotechnology and
Patent Eligibility, LANDSLIDE, May-June 2017, at 48, 52.
12
The new patent system, as mandated by the Supreme Court’s patent ineligibility rules
that destroy important industries, has alarmed many, including David Kappos, the former
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”) Commissioner. See Steven Lundberg,
Dave Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101, NAT’L L. REV. (Apr. 14, 2016),
https://www.natlawreview.com/article/dave-kappos-calls-abolition-section-101 (reporting
that patent eligibility exclusion for key U.S. industries like biotechnology and software is

1692

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1687

patent protection for inventions, investors are inclined to either reduce their
investments in innovation and invention or shift attention to other jurisdictions
where strong patent protection and certainty reign. 13
Second, for most research universities and institutions, government funding
and grants for innovations have diminished and been forced into a constant
uncertainty.14 The stagnation in science investment in the United States has
opened the door for new breakthroughs to occur outside the United States,
notably in China and Europe.15 Part of the reason for the funding decline is the
new anti-science rhetoric that has ridiculed scientific projects and injected much

causing prominent lawyers to recommend their clients seek stronger patent protection in
Europe and China).
13
See id. (noting that inventors have begun to “aggressively seek protection in other
countries where protection for biotechnology and software is readily available”); Kevin
Madigan & Adam Mossoff, Turning Gold into Lead: How Patent Eligibility Doctrine Is
Undermining U.S. Leadership in Innovation, 24 GEO. MASON L. REV. 939, 939 (2017)
(demonstrating through empirical evidence that, of 17,743 patent applications rejected by
USPTO, 1694 were granted protection by European Patent Office, China’s SIPO, or both).
14
Illustratively, Gerald Denis, a Boston University School of Medicine associate professor
of pharmacology and medicine in the Cancer Research Center and a fellow of the Obesity
Society, summarized the current stage of anti-science:
The last few years of funding uncertainties have been deadly, and several investigators I
know have lost their jobs because grants were terminated. Cancer cohorts have been lost,
long-term studies decimated. Who will be around to make the next set of American
medical discoveries and advances? This is no way to maintain international scientific
leadership.
Art Jahne, Who Picks Up the Tab for Science? For Half a Century, the Government Funded
Research. Times Are Changing, B.U. RES.: THE BRINK (Apr. 6, 2015), http://www.bu.edu/
research/articles/funding-for-scientific-research/ [https://perma.cc/C5NQ-JN2H]; see also
Basken & Voosen, supra note 2 (stating that abandonment of research project and severe
reduction in recruitment of graduate students and research fellows due to lack of funding have
led survey respondents to use words like “depression, discouragement, and stress” in
describing their concerns about the future).
15
Following The Future Postponed, MIT released a second study, The Future Postponed
2.0. MIT COMM. TO EVALUATE THE INNOVATION DEFICIT, THE FUTURE POSTPONED 2.0: WHY
DECLINING INVESTMENT IN BASIC RESEARCH THREATENS A U.S. INNOVATION DEFICIT (2016),
http://www.futurepostponed.org/s/Future-Postponed-20-web.pdf
[https://perma.cc/Z33BTY8P]. The introduction states that:
[A] recently-launched Chinese satellite, for example, is testing the use of quantum
entanglement to provide a communications link back to Earth that would be untappable,
and Chinese scientists have used gene editing tools to create a new strain of wheat that
is resistant to a widespread fungal disease. The European Union has invested more
heavily than the U.S. in R&D of new energy technologies and in many areas of space
research.
Id. at 1.
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uncertainty into ongoing research.16 Moreover, the new patent law regime
passed in 2013 removed the grace period for researchers because the first-toinvent system has been replaced by the first–to-file system.17 Researchers must
watch their publication or disclosure; otherwise they face a statutory bar for lack
of novelty.18 Additionally, once they obtain patents, universities and institutions
face challenges to their ownership and commercialization of their patents.
Consequently, the incentive to innovate in research centers across the United
States is declining.19
Lastly, in its most recent attack, the U.S. government has significantly
weakened the tax system governing innovation. In the Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of
2017 (“TCJA”), Congress eliminated an important tax deduction for research
and development (“R&D”), eliminated preferential capital gains rate treatment
for inventors, added an excise tax on the net investment income (including
royalties) of certain private colleges and universities, and enacted a host of
international tax provisions that may push innovation offshore. The TCJA is also
notable for what it did not do. It did not enhance the current tax credit for R&D,
and it did not adopt a so-called U.S. patent box (i.e., a low effective tax rate on
intellectual property income). Congress ignored repeated calls for both of these
measures—measures that many countries have adopted in recent years to attract
valuable innovation activity to their borders. These disruptive changes to the
U.S. tax system, which is now more noticeably misaligned with the tax systems
in Europe and China, will undoubtedly have a negative impact on American
innovation.

16
See MATT RIDLEY, THE EVOLUTION OF EVERYTHING: HOW NEW IDEAS EMERGE 140
(2015) (arguing that government should stay out of natural evolution of science innovation
and should leave it to private sector to finance research). But see Nathan Myhrvold, Every
Genius Needs a Benefactor, SCI. AM., Feb. 2016, at 11, 11 (arguing that anti-science
arguments are “dangerously wrong” because “[w]ithout government support, most basic
scientific research will never happen”).
17
Arpita Bhattacharyya & Eric P. Raciti, The Not-So-Amazing Grace Period Under the
AIA, CIPA J. (Sept. 2012), https://www.finnegan.com/en/insights/the-not-so-amazing-graceperiod-under-the-aia.html [https://perma.cc/7MDV-4SKP] (stating that “the § 102(b)(1)(B)
exception in the AIA does not appear to have been crafted to engender early publication of
inventions,” but causes “prior publication of an invention [to be] fraught with many
downsides”). Universities and independent inventors have attempted to restore the grace
period to pre-AIA era. See Dennis Crouch, Grace Period Restoration Act of 2015, PATENTLYO (Apr. 14, 2015), https://patentlyo.com/patent/2015/04/grace-period-restoration.html
[https://perma.cc/9QU3-G2NK].
18
Bhattacharyya & Raciti, supra note 17 (illustrating uncertainties surrounding “grace
period non-inventor disclosure” exception in AIA and advocating early filing).
19
While innovations are in decline, schools with entrepreneurship programs ironically
have drastically increased in number. See Schramm, supra note 1. Sadly, these programs are
empty promises, as the students often generate worthless business plans. Id. (observing that
70% of business plans from entrepreneurship programs have no value).
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The Article proceeds as follows. Part I explains ways in which the
government has traditionally supported innovation, including a strong and
inclusive patent system for innovation, direct funding of basic and applied
research, and various tax incentives for private investment in innovation to
compensate for failures in the market. Part II exposes recent changes in these
innovation policy tools—a weakening of the patent system and decline in basic
and late-stage R&D funding, as well as a weakening of the tax system governing
innovation—and likely consequences. Part III argues that these disruptive
changes threaten the future of domestic innovation, potentially driving
innovation activities offshore. The Article concludes that in this innovation crisis
stronger patent rights would assist in shaping a stronger economy. 20 Along with
restoring stronger patents and increasing funding for basic and advanced
research, enhancing tax incentives for innovation is necessary to cope with the
rising tax competition from China and Europe.
I.

GOVERNMENT SUPPORT OF INNOVATION

Economists generally agree that innovation21 is important to economic growth
and building national wealth.22 Economists also generally agree that private
20
See Maureen K. Ohlhausen, Acting Chairman, FTC, Address at the Hillsdale College
Free Market Forum: Markets, Government, and the Common Good (Oct. 13, 2017) (transcript
available
at
https://www.ftc.gov/system/files/documents/public_statements/1264483/
ohlhausen_-_hillsdale_speech_10-13-17.pdf [https://perma.cc/2AQ4-TMES]) (discussing
importance of “strong patent rights to the U.S. economy”).
21
The word “innovation” has many slightly different variations. See, e.g., Pete Foley,
What Is Innovation? 15 Experts Share Their Innovation Definition, IDEA TO VALUE (Mar. 18,
2016),
https://www.ideatovalue.com/inno/nickskillicorn/2016/03/innovation-15-expertsshare-innovation-definition/ [https://perma.cc/3JU3-UE85].
22
See Michael J. Graetz & Rachael Doud, Technological Innovation, International
Competition, and the Challenges of International Income Taxation, 113 COLUM. L. REV. 347,
348 (2013) (citing Joseph F. Brodley, The Economic Goals of Antitrust, Efficiency, Consumer
Welfare, and Technological Progress, 62 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1020, 1026 (1987)) (“The
importance of technological development to economic growth has been accepted [since
1957].”); Herbert Hovenkamp, Restraints on Innovation, 29 CARDOZO L. REV. 247, 253
(2007) (“[T]oday no one doubts his basic conclusion that innovation and technological
progress very likely contribute much more to economic growth than policy pressures that
drive investment and output . . . .”); Robert M. Solow, Technical Change and the Aggregate
Production Function, 39 REV. ECON. & STAT. 312, 320 (1957) (suggesting that economic
growth in U.S. at beginning of twentieth century largely stemmed from technological
advances); Sandra Pianalto, President & Chief Exec. Officer, Fed. Reserve Bank of
Cleveland, Speech at University of Akron JumpStart Exchange Event: The Importance of
Innovation to Our Regional Economy (July 13, 2005) (transcript available at
https://www.clevelandfed.org/newsroom-and-events/speeches/sp-20050713-the-importanceof-innovation-to-our-regional-economy.aspx [https://perma.cc/4ZNU-JSQD]) (“[N]early 90
percent of the rise in U.S. prosperity during the first half of the twentieth century came from
technological growth, and not, as most economists had assumed, from the mere accumulation
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investment in innovation is less than what those economic benefits warrant. 23
That is because private firms cannot capture all the benefits of their private
investment in innovation due to the spillover effects of research. Numerous
studies have found that the social returns to private spending greatly exceed the
average private returns.24 Through the lens of economic theory, this excess (the
spillover effects or external benefits) takes on the appearance of market failure;
specifically, too few resources are being spent on innovation. To remedy this
market failure, the government has stepped in to support innovation. 25
The U.S. government supports new innovation in a variety of ways. First, it
provides legal protection for innovation. Second, it provides direct support in
the form of research performed by government agencies, grants, direct loans,

of machinery.”); Christine A. Varney, Assistant Attorney Gen., Antitrust Div. U.S. DOJ,
Remarks as Prepared for the Joint Workshop of the United States Patent and Trademark
Office, the Federal Trade Commission, and the Department of Justice on the Intersection of
Patent Policy and Competition Policy: Implications for Promoting Innovation (May 26, 2010)
(transcript available at https://www.justice.gov/atr/file/518211/download [https://perma.cc
/MKP6-Q5SD]) (“Invention and innovation are critical in promoting economic growth,
creating jobs, and maintaining our competitiveness in the global economy.”).
23
See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31181, RESEARCH TAX CREDIT:
CURRENT LAW AND POLICY ISSUES FOR THE 114TH CONGRESS 1-2 (2015) (noting that public
policy must supplement private investment in technological R&D).
24
See Edwin Mansfield, Microeconomics of Technological Innovation, in THE POSITIVE
SUM STRATEGY: HARNESSING TECHNOLOGY FOR ECONOMIC GROWTH 309 (Ralph Landau &
Nathan Rosenberg eds., 1986) (noting that social rates of return on technological innovation
tend to be higher than private rate of returns); Charles I. Jones & John C. Williams, Measuring
the Social Return to R&D, 113 Q.J. ECON. 1119, 1134 (1998) (“A number of studies in [the]
literature purport to find large rates of return to R&D, suggesting substantial
underinvestment.”). Examples of positive spillover effects include attracting engineers,
scientists, and other high-value workers, as well as luring capital essential for intellectual
property. See Graetz & Doud, supra note 22, at 406 (“R&D incentives are intended to attract
and benefit high-value workers, especially scientists and engineers; to lure the physical and
financial capital essential for technological innovation; to reward national MNEs’ activities;
and to create valuable intangible capital.”).
25
See OFFICE OF TAX POLICY, U.S. DEP’T OF THE TREASURY, INVESTING IN U.S.
COMPETITIVENESS: THE BENEFITS OF ENHANCING THE RESEARCH AND EXPERIMENTATION
(R&E) TAX CREDIT 1 (2011) (“The R&E tax credit is designed to address this underinvestment
and to increase the total amount of research activity undertaken in the United States.”); ORG.
FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., TAX INCENTIVES FOR RESEARCH AND DEVELOPMENT:
TRENDS AND ISSUES 7 (2002), http://www.oecd.org/sti/inno/2498389.pdf [https://perma.cc
/325V-EXKH] (“Market incentives alone are insufficient to produce an adequate supply of
R&D, making it crucial for governments to stimulate private R&D spending.”); Graetz &
Doud, supra note 22, at 349 (citing Jones & Williams, supra note 24, at 1133) (“[R]esearch
and development . . . which is crucial to ongoing technological advances, is underproduced
in the absence of government support.”).
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and loan guarantees. And third, the government provides indirect support, such
as tax incentives. Each of these strategies deserves separate attention.
A.

A Strong and Inclusive Patent System for Innovation

Patents are important to incentivizing innovation.26 The United States
modernized the patent system to encourage innovation by adopting the 1952
Patent Code and creating a specialized appellate court in 1982 for patent cases.
Both momentous events fostered a philosophy of patent inclusion for new
technology to be discovered and protected, and they provided a path to a strong
and robust patent system.27 Most importantly, the two events cemented the
important role of patents, propelling the nation to value intangible property and
paving ways for the nation to cope as manufacturing jobs were moving offshore
for cheap labor.28
The notion of modernizing patent law evolved decades ago. While the nation
was facing years of economic malaise caused by monopolistic trusts, on April
29, 1938, President Franklin Delano Roosevelt identified the then-antiquated
patent system as one of the culprits of the malaise in his message to Congress. 29
He called for amendment of the patent law.30 The intervening World War II
years prolonged the troubled patent system, in which substantive patent law

26

Laura G. Pedraza-Fariña, Patent Law and the Sociology of Innovation, 2013 WIS. L.
REV. 813, 873 (“Patent law is one of the primary policy tools through which society provides
incentives for technological innovation.”).
27
See A. Samuel Oddi, Assault on the Citadel: Judge Rich and Computer-Related
Inventions, 39 HOUS. L. REV. 1033, 1035-36 (2002) (discussing intention of 1952 Code as
drafted by Judge Rich).
28
Gerald Sobel, The Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit: A Fifth Anniversary Look
at Its Impact on Patent Law and Litigation, 37 AM. U. L. REV. 1087, 1091 (1988) (stating that
creation of Federal Circuit “brought about a philosophical change which strengthens the
patent system” and that “setting in which this has occurred is significant” because “[a]s the
nation’s basic manufacturing industries suffer from competition with foreign suppliers, our
ability to innovate new products and processes has become of utmost economic importance.
The relative value of intangible technical knowledge has grown as basic manufacturing has
moved to lower-cost areas abroad”).
29
Franklin D. Roosevelt, President of the United States, Recommendations to the
Congress to Curb Monopolies and the Concentration of Economic Power (Apr. 29, 1938), in
7 THE PUBLIC PAPERS AND ADDRESSES OF FRANKLIN D. ROOSEVELT: THE CONTINUING
STRUGGLE FOR LIBERALISM 315 (1941) (arguing that “effects of tax, patent and other
government policies cannot be ignored” as drivers of then-current economic problems).
30
President Roosevelt specifically emphasized patent licensing as a means to suppress
industrial monopolies, and that “amendment should not deprive the inventor of his royalty
rights, but generally speaking, future patents might be made available for use by any one upon
payment of appropriate royalties.” Id. at 318.
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existed in judicial opinions but not in statutory provision. 31 The Patent Office’s
decisions on patent applications were not based on statutes, and the Supreme
Court was hostile towards patents.32 Notably, Justice Jackson, writing for the
Court, propounded in 1949 that “the only patent that is valid is one which this
Court has not been able to get its hands on.”33
Against that backdrop, the post-World War II years of American
exceptionalism34 were ripe for modernizing the patent system. Congressional
efforts to modernize the patent system for innovation took five years to
accomplish, giving birth to the transformative 1952 Patent Code.35 One of the
key drivers whose vision, leadership, and hard work contributed to the creation
of the 1952 Patent Code was Judge Giles S. Rich, the titan of patent law.36

31
See Giles S. Rich, Congressional Intent—Or, Who Wrote the Patent Act of 1952?, in
PATENT PROCUREMENT AND EXPLOITATION: PROTECTING INTELLECTUAL RIGHTS 63 (Sw.
Legal Found. ed., 1963) (“In the late 1940’s there was discontent in the patent bar. The
practical value of patents was being downgraded. The courts were, on the average, applying
a too stringent test for ‘invention’ . . . .”).
32
See George E. Frost, Judge Rich and the 1952 Patent Code—A Retrospective, 76 J. PAT.
& TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 343, 345-47 (1994) (describing pre-1952 administrative and
judicial onslaught and birth of 1952 Patent Code); James F. Davis, Judge Giles S. Rich: His
Life and Legacy Revisited, LANDSLIDE, Sept.-Oct. 2009, at 8, 10 (providing examples of
Supreme Court’s hostility towards patents in late 1940s, including diminished value of patents
in The Mercoid Cases, which mortally wounded contributory infringement, a valuable tool to
patent enforcement).
33
Jungerson v. Ostby & Barton Co., 335 U.S. 560, 572 (1949) (Jackson, J., dissenting)
(“It would not be difficult to cite many instances of patents that have been granted, improperly
I think, and without adequate tests of invention by the Patent Office. But I doubt that the
remedy for such Patent Office passion for granting patents is an equally strong passion in this
Court for striking them down so that the only patent that is valid is one which this Court has
not been able to get its hands on.”).
34
Michael C.C. Adams, The American Experience During World War II, OXFORD RES.
ENCYCLOPEDIAS: AM. HIST. (Aug. 2016), http://americanhistory.oxfordre.com/view/10.1093
/acrefore/9780199329175.001.0001/acrefore-9780199329175-e-344 [https://perma.cc/24MZ
-LMSF] (stating that World War II “vastly enhanced the American sense of
exceptionalism . . . the inherent goodness of America’s intentions and its self-evident global
mission to preserve democracy making its wrongdoing necessary and therefore innocent”).
35
See Frost, supra note 32, at 343.
36
See generally Davis, supra note 32 (recalling and analyzing profound legacy left by
Judge Rich to patent law and policy); see also Bradford J. Duft, Fidelity, 81 J. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 767, 767 (1999) (“Mention of Judge Rich evokes a number of
thoughts. . . . In broad, historic terms, we picture the father of modern patent law.
Consequently, thinking of Judge Rich also reminds us of the Patent Act of 1952, which he coauthored.”).
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The 1952 Patent Code was a significant milestone in the development of
patent law.37 It enshrined into patent statutes that once a patent is granted by the
Patent Office, it is presumed valid independently of the validity of other
claims.38 That means that each patent claim must meet all the statutory
requirements for patentability.39 The 1952 Patent Code logically clarified and
codified patentability requirements into separate components: patentability
subject matter, utility, novelty, and non-obviousness. 40 On the non-obviousness
requirement, the Patent Code created an objective standard on which the courts
and the Patent Office can rely to determine patentability, and the requirement
soon became the “cornerstone for a new era in patent law.”41 Further, the 1952
Patent Code codified contributory infringement to empower patentees for

37
Judge Rich, in his famous “Anatomy of the Patent Statute” opinion, explained how the
problems of confusion, inaccuracy, and ambiguity plagued the old law and how the new law
addressed them. See In re Bergy, 596 F.2d 952, 959-60 (C.C.P.A. 1979) (“The 1952 Act
divided that statute up into its logical components and added the nonobviousness requirement,
which until then had been imposed only by court decisions. This attempt at a clearcut
statement to replace what had been a hodgepodge of separate enactments resulted in a new
and official Title 35 in the United States Code with three main divisions. Part I pertains to the
establishment and organization of the PTO. Part II, here involved, covers patentability of
inventions and the grant of patents. Part III relates to issued patents and the protection of the
rights conferred by them.”), vacated as moot sub nom., Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 44 U.S.
1028 (1980) (mem.).
38
35 U.S.C. § 282(a) (2012) (“A patent shall be presumed valid. Each claim of a
patent . . . shall be presumed valid independently of the validity of other claims.”).
39
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 96 (2011) (“To receive patent protection
a claimed invention must, among other things, fall within one of the express categories of
patentable subject matter, § 101, and be novel, § 102, and nonobvious, § 103.”).
40
Donald S. Chisum, Weeds and Seeds in the Supreme Court’s Business Method Patents
Decision: New Directions for Regulating Patent Scope, 15 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 11, 31
(2011) (praising “neatness in addressing patentability in numerical order: Section 101
(eligibility subject matter and utility), Section 102 (novelty), Section 103 (nonobviousness),
and so on” and recalling Judge Rich’s reference of ordering as “three doors” of patentability);
David O. Taylor, Confusing Patent Eligibility, 84 TENN. L. REV. 157, 177-78 (2016)
(explaining how Judge Rich delineated section 103 of nonobviousness from section 101
patentable subject matter in codifying common law for 1952 Patent Code).
41
Davis, supra 32, at 10.
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enforcement purposes,42 a means-plus-function section,43 and other aspects of
substantive patent law. The codification of judicial decisions and clarification of
various statutory provisions with explicit definitions enabled the Patent Office
to issue Office Actions with clear reliance on statutory reasoning.44 Overall, the
new law transformed the antiquated patent system both substantively and
procedurally. It marked a new beginning for a robust patent system in which
more patent applications would be filed on new innovations soon to be
discovered by the average inventor. It was a new era of patent incentive and
inclusion.45
The patent system for innovation, however, was incomplete if one only
considered the statutory regime; to interpret the law, jurists with a strong
understanding of patent law and practice were needed.46 This led to the

42

Id. at 9 (noting that reestablishment of contributory infringement regime was main
achievement of Patent Act of 1952); see also Erwin J. Basinski, Some Comments on
Contributory and Induced Patent Infringement; Implications for Software Developers, 81 J.
PAT. & TRADEMARK OFF. SOC’Y 777, 777-78 (1999) (stating that according to Judge Rich,
“prior to 1952, the courts had confused the old equity maxim of ‘unclean hands’ and its
application to patent law called ‘the misuse doctrine’ with the common law doctrine of
‘contributory infringement.’ . . . This had the effect of making the contributory infringement
claim totally ineffective . . . . As a result, The Patent Act of 1952 added the revised Article
271 to clarify these issues” (footnote omitted)).
43
See Pennwalt Corp. v. Durand-Wayland, Inc., 833 F.2d 931, 933-34 (Fed. Cir. 1987)
(explaining history of section 112, paragraph 6, of Patent Act of 1952).
44
Frost, supra note 32, at 352-53 (“In 1944 the Supreme Court reversed the lower court in
the Halliburton case. In the process it cast doubt on the validity of endless numbers of patent
claims and on the settled Patent Office practice. 35 USC 112 changed the law as expressed in
that case by affirming the validity of means claims . . . .” (footnote omitted)).
45
Judge Rich, the principal author of the 1952 Patent Code, expressed his view on the
incentive role of patent law to encourage the average inventors to invent:
It is difficult to understand the attitude of those who feel that ideally a patent should be
granted only for the meritorious invention which is capable of being a commercial
success. Patents are not Nobel or Pulitzer prizes! They are not for exceptional inventors
but for average inventors and should not be made hard to get. True, they are temporary
monopolies, but therein alone lies their power as inducements to invent, to disclose, to
invest, and to design around. Why must an invention be a commercially hot number to
be patentable? If it is a total dud, how is the public injured by a patent on it? A monopoly
on something nobody wants is pretty much a nullity. That is one of the beauties of the
patent system. The reward is measured automatically by the popularity of the
contribution . . . . The only possibility of doing damage is so to construe a patent on a
dud as to cover a commercially meritorious invention made by a more competent
inventor, but it is not noticeable that courts have a tendency to do that.
Giles S. Rich, Principles of Patentability, 28 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 393, 401-02 (1960)
(emphasis omitted).
46
See WILLIAM M. LANDES & RICHARD A. POSNER, THE ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF
INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 7 (2003) (observing that creation of Federal Circuit is “perhaps
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subsequent creation in 1982 of the Federal Circuit as the sole appellate court
with jurisdiction to hear patent cases.47 The creation of the Federal Circuit
marked a pivotal recognition that patents are important to the economy and that
uniform law for patents is necessary.48 The Federal Circuit quickly established
itself as the patent court of the nation.49 Its impact on patent jurisprudence was
immediately recognized. For example, in the first five years of existence, the
Federal Circuit strengthened the statutory presumption of validity. 50 Its
interpretation of the law dictated a heightened burden on those who wished to
challenge the statutory presumption of validity, requiring the party asserting
invalidity to prove it by clear and convincing evidence.51 Consequently, the

the single most significant institutional innovation in the field of intellectual property in the
last quarter-century”).
47
Richard H. Sayler, The Case for Arbitrating Intellectual Property Licensing Disputes,
DISP. RESOL. J., Feb.-Apr. 2005, at 62, 64 (“Since its creation, the U.S. Court of Appeals for
the Federal Circuit has in fact fulfilled one of its purposes—to speak with a single voice on
important issues of patent law so that the rules governing the validity, enforceability, and
infringement of patents do not vary from circuit to circuit as they sometimes did.”); Larry D.
Thompson, Jr., Adrift on a Sea of Uncertainty: Preserving Uniformity in Patent Law PostVornado Through Deference to the Federal Circuit, 92 GEO. L.J. 523, 525 (2004) (“In the
eyes of many commentators, the Federal Circuit has done an admirable job achieving those
goals.”).
48
Christianson v. Colt Indus. Operating Corp., 798 F.2d 1051, 1058 (7th Cir. 1986) (“The
primary purposes for the creation of the Federal Circuit were to provide greater uniformity in
the substantive law of patents and to prevent the inevitable forum shopping that results from
conflicting patent decisions in the regional circuits.”). Businesses responded to the creation
of the Federal Circuit by increasing their focus on patents as strategic assets. See W.L. Gore
& Assocs., Inc. v. Comptroller, No. 07-IN-OO-0084, 2010 WL 5927989, at *2 (Md. T.C.
Nov. 9, 2010) (noting that Gore-Tex parent company decided to form patent holding company
as response to “significant changes in Federal patent policy that led to the creation of the U.S.
Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, which required increased focus on strategic
management of patents”).
49
Michael J. Burstein, Rules for Patents, 52 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1747, 1757 (2011)
(“[T]he Federal Circuit has become the most important expositor of the substantive law of
patents in the United States.”); Paul R. Gugliuzza, The Federal Circuit as a Federal Court,
54 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1791, 1795 (2013) (stating that Federal Circuit has consolidated its
power to shape patent law).
50
See Sobel, supra note 28, at 1089 (identifying areas in which Federal Circuit quickly
made its impact, including strengthening statutory presumption of validity).
51
See, e.g., Bausch & Lomb, Inc. v. Barnes-Hind/Hydrocurve, Inc., 796 F.2d 443, 446-47
(Fed. Cir. 1986) (finding that record below “contains no reference to this statutory
presumption of validity, nor does it appear that the district court considered separately the
validity of the three claims at issue. By merely holding that ‘defendants have proved by clear
and convincing evidence that the patent in suit (4,194,814) and each of its claims is invalid
and therefore void,’ the district court improperly denied the ’814 patent its statutory
presumption of validity as to each claim”). The Federal Circuit’s clear and convincing
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presumption of validity creates certainty for patent holders. With that certainty,
the patent holders can rely on their patents for financing, commercialization, and
protection.52
It should come as no surprise that Judge Rich, the author of the 1952 Patent
Code, became the bridge between the modern patent statute and judicial
interpretations of patent law. He first served on the Court of Customs and Patent
Appeals in 1956 and continued to serve on the newly formed Federal Circuit
from the day of its inception on October 1, 1982, until his death on July 9,
1999.53 He penned 892 opinions and participated in over 3000 cases.54 His
contribution as a patent jurist was monumental in shaping the modern patent
system to have a “policy of inclusion” of “newly evolving technology.”55
Indeed, the Federal Circuit diligently addressed every area of patent law to
encourage inclusion and innovation.56 For example, the Federal Circuit
permitted evidence of commercial success to be probative of a patented
invention’s non-obviousness,57 elevating commercial success to a substantial
consideration in patent validity.58 This would be helpful to businesses and
entrepreneurs that experienced early commercial success with their inventions
and could now rely on that success to withstand a challenge to obviousness. 59 In
standard of proof was affirmed by the Supreme Court thirty years after Judge Rich first
interpreted 35 U.S.C. § 282. See Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, 564 U.S. 91, 95 (2011).
52
For example, patent holders use patents as collateral when they borrow from lenders.
The number of patents serving as collateral increased from 848 in 1980 to 178,855 in 2016.
See Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Erik Hille, Patent Aversion: An Empirical Study of Patents
Collateral in Bank Lending, 1980-2016, 9 U.C. IRVINE L. REV. 141, 157 (2018).
53
Oddi, supra note 27, at 1033-34.
54
Id. at 1034.
55
Id. at 1035-36.
56
See generally Damon C. Andrews, Promoting the Progress: Three Decades of Patent
Jurisprudence in the Court of Appeals for the Federal Circuit, 76 MO. L. REV. 839 (2011)
(providing comprehensive analysis of Federal Circuit’s decisions over thirty years since
creation and identifying areas where Federal Circuit has made significant development).
57
See Merck & Co., Inc. v. Teva Pharm. USA, Inc., 395 F.3d 1364, 1376 (Fed. Cir. 2005)
(noting importance of commercial success in context of obviousness analysis); Merck & Co.,
Inc. v. Biocraft Labs., Inc., 874 F.2d 804, 809 n.* (Fed. Cir. 1989) (“Commercial success is
an indication of nonobviousness that must be considered in a patentability analysis . . . .”);
Hybritech Inc. v. Monoclonal Antibodies, Inc., 802 F.2d 1367, 1380 (Fed. Cir. 1986).
58
See generally Robert P. Merges, Commercial Success and Patent Standards: Economic
Perspectives on Innovation, 76 CALIF. L. REV. 803 (1988) (tracing origins of “secondary
considerations” and Federal Circuit’s line of cases on “commercial success”).
59
On the other hand, others disagree with the Federal Circuit’s emphasis on commercial
success for nonobviousness, as they believe that such emphasis would hurt small businesses
because there would be “a shift of resources away from the inventive act toward the
commercial act.” Reed W.L. Marcy, Note, Patent Law’s Nonobviousness Requirement: The
Effect of Inconsistent Standards Regarding Commercial Success on the Individual Inventor,
19 HASTINGS COMM. & ENT. L.J. 199, 216-17 (1996); see also Merges, supra note 58, at 827
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addition, the Federal Circuit warned against hindsight bias in obviousness
analysis.60
In the computer-related revolution, the Federal Circuit mapped its
jurisprudence on patentability subject matter with care in order to embrace the
average inventor’s innovations in business methods and software fields by
favoring a broad construction of 35 U.S.C. § 101 for the new technological
developments.61 Specifically, in the State Street Bank & Trust Co. v. Signature
Financial Group, Inc.62 decision, the Federal Circuit widened the patent
inclusion door to welcome business methods and software inventions if they
involve some type of practice application and produce a “useful, concrete, and
tangible result.”63 Consequently, innovations flourished as average inventors
could reap the incentive benefits of securing patents in new fields. 64
In the biotech revolution, the Federal Circuit widened the door on
patentability of inventions related to seeds and seed-grown plants, gene

(“[T]he Federal Circuit has transformed commercial success from a tiebreaker to a virtual
trump card.”).
60
Andrews, supra note 56, at 854 (stating that Federal Circuit shaped its jurisprudence on
nonobviousness further in In re Dembiczak, 175 F.3d 994 (Fed. Cir. 1999), abrogated by In
re Gartside, 203 F.3d 1305 (Fed. Cir. 2000), where it “delineated its hindsight-bias analysis
by refining the specificity with which an invention must have been obvious at a past moment
in time”).
61
See Oddi, supra note 27, at 1039-40 (providing rich retrospective analysis of Federal
Circuit’s decisions, particularly of Judge Rich’s seminal decisions, to have computer-related
inventions sail past § 101 muster).
62
149 F.3d 1368 (Fed. Cir. 1998), abrogated by In re Bilski, 545 F.3d 943 (Fed. Cir. 2008).
63
Id. at 1373. The Court held that the invention involving “a data processing system for
managing a financial services configuration of a portfolio established as a partnership” was
patentable because “[g]iven the complexity of the calculations, a computer or equivalent
device [was] a virtual necessity to perform the task.” Id. at 1371-72. The Court addressed the
“business method” exception to statutory subject matter and took the “opportunity to lay this
ill-conceived exception to rest.” Id. at 1375.
64
See generally Josh Lerner, Where Does State Street Lead? A First Look at Finance
Patents, 1971-2000, 57 J. FIN. 901 (2002) (examining patents for financial formulas and
methods after State Street decision); Josh Lerner et al., Financial Patent Quality: Finance
Patents After State Street (Harvard Bus. Sch., Working Paper No. 16-068, 2015)
http://www.hbs.edu/faculty/Publication%20Files/16-068_702dabb8-70c5-4917-a25775dc8b0c4f6b.pdf [https://perma.cc/BS2G-C3JX] (analyzing new niche of patents relating to
finance business methods).
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sequences,65 and personalized medicine.66 Overall, inventors enjoyed patent
protection for their inventions in different fields.
In addition to expanding the scope of patent law, the court modified the
standard for injunctive relief to afford patentees the opportunity to receive a
permanent injunction against defendants upon a finding of infringement.
Relying on the predictability of the Federal Circuit’s jurisprudence on
permanent injunctions, patentees used that certainty as leverage when they
negotiated settlements with defendants who had already been found to be
infringing on the patents.67 From willful infringement, good faith reliance on
advice of counsel, and fraud defense, to every other facet of patent law, the
Federal Circuit fully embraced its role as created by Congress, molding patent
law into a new philosophy of strengthening the incentive to innovate.68
The Federal Circuit’s strong patent philosophy developed amidst a new
economic reality in the United States. Companies in every sector of
manufacturing were moving from the United States to other countries for
cheaper labor.69 Foreign goods from electronics to automobiles flooded the U.S.
65
Ass’n for Molecular Pathology v. U.S. Patent & Trademark Office, 653 F.3d 1329,
1333-34 (Fed. Cir. 2011) (holding that composition claims covering isolated DNA sequences
and method claim for screening potential cancer therapeutics via changes in cell growth rate
were patentable subject matter), aff’d in part, rev’d in part sub nom., Ass’n for Molecular
Pathology v. Myriad Genetics, Inc., 569 U.S. 576 (2013).
66
Prometheus Labs., Inc. v. Mayo Collaborative Servs., 628 F.3d 1347, 1349 (Fed. Cir.
2010) (holding that methods for calculating thiopurine dosage was patentable), rev’d, 566
U.S. 66 (2012).
67
MercExchange, L.L.C. v. eBay, Inc., 401 F.3d 1323, 1339 (Fed. Cir. 2005) (“If the
injunction gives the patentee additional leverage in licensing, that is a natural consequence of
the right to exclude and not an inappropriate reward to a party that does not intend to compete
in the marketplace with potential infringers.”), vacated, 547 U.S. 388 (2006). The Federal
Circuit’s special rule for patent injunctive remedies did not last, as the Supreme Court vacated
and remanded in eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 394 (2006); see also id.
at 396-97 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (“When the patented invention is but a small component
of the product the companies seek to produce and the threat of an injunction is employed
simply for undue leverage in negotiations, legal damages may well be sufficient to
compensate for the infringement and an injunction may not serve the public interest.”).
68
The patent system’s incentive for innovation has been studied. See generally Matthew
S. Clancy & GianCarlo Moschini, Incentives for Innovation: Patents, Prizes, and Research
Contracts, 35 APPLIED ECON. PERSP. & POL’Y 206 (2013); Paul Belleflamme, Note, Patents
and Incentives to Innovate: Some Theoretical and Empirical Economic Evidence, 13 ETHICAL
PERSP. 267 (2006).
69
Marilyn Geewax, U.S. Manufacturing: A Remembrance and a Look Ahead, NPR (Oct.
3, 2014, 7:06 AM), https://www.npr.org/2014/10/03/353044962/u-s-manufacturing-aremembrance-and-a-look-ahead [https://perma.cc/Q74L-ZWZ7] (“In 1979, nearly 20 million
Americans made goods for a living. Today, only about 12 million are still standing on factory
floors.”); Heather Long, U.S. Has Lost 5 Million Manufacturing Jobs Since 2000, CNN (Mar.
29, 2016, 3:47 PM), http://money.cnn.com/2016/03/29/news/economy/us-manufacturing-
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market.70 U.S. trade deficits expanded.71 In addition, five new industries related
to computers, electronics, and semiconductors have been identified as having
contributed to manufacturing job losses in the United States.72 The rise of these
new industries, healthcare, and other services emphasizes the important role of
innovations.73 In fact, economists have identified that innovation is the key
driver of economic growth.74 Innovation is risky and requires many attempts,
revisions, and do-overs. It also demands originality, patience, teamwork, and
jobs/index.html [https://perma.cc/LXF9-G2MW] (reporting decline in U.S. manufacturing
jobs from 24% of workers employed in manufacturing in 1960, to 19% in 1980, 13% in 2000,
and 8% in 2016); Mark Muro, Manufacturing Jobs Aren’t Coming Back, MIT TECH. REV.
(Nov. 18, 2016), https://www.technologyreview.com/s/602869/manufacturing-jobs-arentcoming-back/ (noting that “collapse of labor-intensive commodity manufacturing in recent
decades and the expansion in this decade of super-productive advanced manufacturing”
caused “massive 30-year decline of employment beginning in 1980” with U.S. manufacturing
jobs “plung[ing] from 18.9 million jobs to 12.2 million”).
70
Linette Lopez, The White House is Only Telling You Half of the Sad Story of What
Happened to American Jobs, BUS. INSIDER (July 25, 2017, 12:20 PM),
http://www.businessinsider.com/what-happened-to-american-jobs-in-the-80s-2017-7
[https://perma.cc/A98J-TSBF] (“Industries like consumer electronics, automobiles, machine
tools, steel and microelectronics were all hit especially hard by Japan’s advancement.”).
71
United States-China Economic Relations and China’s Role in the Global Economy:
Hearing Before the H. Comm. on Ways and Means, 108th Cong. 19 (2003) (statement of N.
Gregory Mankiw, Chairman, Council of Economic Advisors) (“The U.S. trade deficit with
China in goods is large and more than doubled between 1995 and 2000. So far this year, the
U.S. has a $125 billion (annualized) deficit with China, our single largest bilateral trade
deficit.”).
72
As Professor Mankiw observed, the “five industries that have contributed most
significantly to manufacturing job losses since July 2000 are: computer and electronic
equipment (16.0 percent of all manufacturing job losses), machinery (10.8 percent),
transportation equipment (10.7 percent), fabricated metal products (10.7 percent), and
semiconductor and electronic components (7.5 percent).” Id. at 22.
73
See, e.g., John Haughom, Innovation in Healthcare: Why It’s Needed and Where It’s
Going, HEALTH CATALYST (Dec. 10, 2014), https://www.healthcatalyst.com/innovation-inhealthcare-why-needed-where-going [https://perma.cc/9SHZ-WEQX]. Interestingly, in the
healthcare sector, “compelling innovations” are now not from resource-rich, developed
countries, but from emerging markets due to the ideas that “necessity breeds innovation” and
that entrepreneurs face fewer constraints because of “weaknesses in the infrastructure,
institutions, and resources of emerging markets.” Tilman Ehrbeck, Nicolaus Henke & Thomas
Kibasi, The Emerging Market in Health Care Innovation, MCKINSEY & CO. (May 2010),
https://www.mckinsey.com/industries/healthcare-systems-and-services/our-insights/theemerging-market-in-health-care-innovation [https://perma.cc/7GM3-ZA22].
74
See, e.g., Pianalto, supra note 22 (“[N]early 90 percent of the rise in U.S. prosperity
during the first half of the twentieth century came from technological growth, and not, as most
economists had assumed, from the mere accumulation of machinery.”); Varney, supra note
22 (“Invention and innovation are critical in promoting economic growth, creating jobs, and
maintaining our competitiveness in the global economy.”).
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investment. In the innovation space, technological and intangible knowledge is
essential and more valuable than ever for businesses to compete.75 Patented
inventions stemming from innovation are protected under the strong patent
system as crafted instrumentally by Judge Rich, enhanced by Congress through
its creation of the Federal Circuit, and molded daily by the Federal Circuit that
cherishes the certainty, predictability, patent inclusion, and incentives for
business to innovate.76
Indeed, businesses can rely on the patents obtained to enjoy the exclusive
rights for twenty years.77 Their patents are statutorily presumed valid, as the
Patent Office has examined all of the patentability requirements. Businesses can
rely on the predictability of patent jurisprudence related to infringement,
permanent injunctive relief, affirmative defenses, and privilege, among others,
as interpreted by the Federal Circuit as the bedrock of certainty. 78 In the end,
businesses and their partners and investors can rely on patents as signals of
innovation and exclusivity, as they know all too well that investment in new
technology will not occur if the patents covering the technology and the patent
law are uncertain.79
75

Sobel, supra note 28, at 1091-92 (describing generally patent system’s stimulus of
invention); see also Enterprising States: Executive Summary, U.S. CHAMBER OF COM.
https://www.uschamberfoundation.org/enterprisingstates/assets/files/ExecutiveFOUND.,
Summary-OL.pdf [https://perma.cc/78BS-TYWB] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (noting that
50% of U.S. annual GDP growth is attributed to increases in innovation and identifying key
factors for knowledge and technology-based economy); Pianalto, supra note 22 (“While
innovation leads to higher growth, higher growth can lead to greater investments in R&D,
which will likely lead to more innovation. The forces that drive innovation are not necessarily
random events. They are usually driven by the need to be competitive.”).
76
Robert Pitofsky, Challenges of the New Economy: Issues at the Intersection of Antitrust
and Intellectual Property, 68 ANTITRUST L.J. 913, 923 (2001) (concluding that “Federal
Circuit’s overall attentiveness to preserving incentives to innovate makes sense, particularly
in an economy that depends more and more on innovation to advance consumer welfare”);
Sobel, supra note 28, at 1092 (“The net effect of the Federal Circuit’s work . . . has been to
strengthen the incentive to innovate.”).
77
35 U.S.C. § 154(a)(2) (2012) (“Subject to the payment of fees under this title, such grant
shall be for a term beginning on the date on which the patent issues and ending 20 years from
the date on which the application for the patent was filed in the United States or, if the
application contains a specific reference to an earlier filed application or applications under
section 120, 121, or 365(c), from the date on which the earliest such application was filed.”).
78
See Hon. Pauline Newman, The Federal Circuit: Judicial Stability or Judicial
Activism?, 42 AM. U. L. REV. 683, 684-85 (1993) (stating that reason to establish Federal
Circuit was “forceful concern of the nation’s technological leadership about the effect on
industrial innovation of judge-made patent law . . . . The interest of industry was the
restoration of the patent system’s constitutional and statutory incentive to promote
technological progress”).
79
See, e.g., id. at 685 (“Patent rights are a factor in much of the research, investment, and
commercial risk-taking that comprise industrial innovation . . . .”).
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As planned by the adoption of the 1952 Patent Code and the creation of the
Federal Circuit in 1982 for patent cases, inventors substantially increased patent
application filings and received more patents.80 As noted elsewhere, in the three
decades after the creation of the Federal Circuit, patent grants increased four
times.81 The average inventors, from those in computer-related fields to those in
biotechnology-related sectors, can obtain patent protection for their innovations.
Startups can rely on patent filings and patent grants to seek financing. As a result,
Silicon Valley and technology centers across the nation sprouted up.82
B.

Direct Funding of Basic and Applied Research

On December 12, 1980, two years before the creation of the Federal Circuit,
Congress passed the Bayh-Dole Act to allow universities the right to own and
exploit patents for their innovative research, funded by government grants. 83 The
government understood that patents are property and that property should be
utilized through commercialization, and not be sitting idly. 84 Congress
recognized that universities have ownership of the patents even though the
government has provided the funding necessary for the underlying research,
instilling its belief that institutions and their researchers, rather than the

80
LANDES & POSNER, supra note 46, at 352 (concluding that “creation of the Federal
Circuit appears to have had a positive and significant impact on the number of patent
applications, the number of patents issued, the success rate of patent applications, [and] the
amount of patent litigation”). Other scholars have also added that efforts from the Patent
Office and interest groups lifted the number of patent filings and grants. See, e.g., Clarisa
Long, The PTO and the Market for Influence in Patent Law, 157 U. PA. L. REV. 1965, 198488 (2009).
81
See Gugliuzza, supra note 49, at 1803 n.48 (“Over the past thirty years, the number of
patents issued annually has increased nearly fourfold, from about 58,000 in 1982 to about
225,000 in 2011.”); U.S. Patent Activity: Calendar Years 1790 to the Present, U.S. PAT. &
TRADEMARK OFF., http://www.uspto.gov/web/offices/ac/ido/oeip/taf/h_counts.htm [https:
//perma.cc/XLB2-L3AG] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
82
Zorina Khan, Enterprise and Incentives for Innovation, NAT’L BUREAU OF ECON. RES.
(2017), https://www.nber.org/reporter/2017number1/khan.html [https://perma.cc/M7CNWFVL] (“One of the fundamental features of the American patent system was its role in
facilitating markets in technology and the mobilization of venture capital.”).
83
Universities embraced the landmark Bayh-Dole Act, Pub. L. No. 96-517, 94 Stat. 3015
(1980) (codified as amended at 35 U.S.C. §§ 200-212 (2012)), which has “fundamentally
changed the nation’s system of technology transfer” and led to the increase in “patenting and
licensing groundbreaking discoveries.” Landmark Law Helped Universities Lead the Way,
ASS’N U. TECH. MANAGERS, https://autm.net/about-tech-transfer/advocacy/legislation/bayhdole-act [https://perma.cc/4UHC-T4JQ] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019). Other countries then
followed with similar legislation. See id.
84
Prior to the passage of the Bayh-Dole Act, only 5% of government-owned patents were
utilized by industry. WENDY H. SCHACHT, THE BAYH-DOYLE ACT: SELECTED ISSUES IN
PATENT POLICY AND THE COMMERCIALIZATION OF TECHNOLOGY 2 (2010).
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government, are in a better position to partner with others in industry and
maximize the benefits the patents confer.85 Immediately, universities developed
technology transfer offices to work with their researchers; to seek patent
protections for new technologies coming out of labs, projects, and classrooms;
and to foster the creation of thousands of new companies.86
Consequently, universities became centers for basic scientific research and
thus expanded their reliance on the government for funding in their pursuit of
knowledge. Recognizing the unique role of universities in knowledge creation,
Congress continued to provide grants to researchers for fundamental basic and
applied research after the Bayh-Dole Act. For example, the National Science
Foundation reported that the percentage of basic science research from 1980 to
2001 increased from 66.6% to 74.1%.87 The grants are crucial for researchers to
cover the cost of equipment, materials, supplies, travel to conferences, and
payroll for hiring scientists.88 Researchers enjoyed robust federal funding that

85
Universities commercialize their patents by entering exclusive licensing deals with firms
from different industries. Id. at 4. This is very attractive to industry because, before the
enactment of the Bayh-Dole Act, government agencies often insisted on nonexclusive patent
licenses, which were very unappealing to firms. Id. at 2.
86
David Levenson, Consequences of the Bayh-Dole Act 6 (Dec. 12, 2005) (unpublished
final paper) (available at http://web.mit.edu/lawclub/www/Bayh-Dole%20Act.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/T243-FMZB]) (stating that “about thirty billion dollars of economic activity per
year and 250,000 jobs can be attributed to technologies born in academic institutions”); Ass’n
Univ. Tech. Managers, Thirty Years After Passage, Bayh-Dole Act Drives the Economy,
Protects Public Health, NEWSWISE (May 3, 2010, 12:00 PM), http://www.newswise.com
/articles/thirty-years-after-passage-bayh-dole-act-drives-the-economy-protects-public-health
[https://perma.cc/F8G8-JUGP] (“Since the enactment of Bayh-Dole, more than 5,000 new
companies have formed around university research.”).
87
Levenson, supra note 86.
88
See Chapter II - NSF Awards, NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (July 2005), https://www.nsf.gov/pubs
/manuals/gpm05_131/gpm2.jsp [https://perma.cc/N7A6-9LP2] (describing activities and
materials funded by National Science Foundation); Chapter VI - NSF Allowability of Costs,
NAT’L SCI. FOUND. (July 2005), https://www.nsf.gov/pubs/manuals/gpm05_131/gpm6.jsp
[https://perma.cc/39KF-CF8U] (describing general applicability of federal cost principles to
NSF cost reimbursement grants); Michael Hiltzik, Reduced Public Funding for Basic
Research Leaves U.S. in the Scientific Dust, L.A. TIMES: BUS. (Apr. 28, 2015, 11:42 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/business/hiltzik/la-fi-mh-the-funding-decline-in-basic-research20150428-column.html [https://perma.cc/F2UZ-PNQZ] (reporting that percentage of science
and engineering doctorate holders with full-time faculty appointments was 90% in 1970s);
NIH Grants Policy Statement, NAT’L INST. HEALTH, https://grants.nih.gov/grants
/policy/nihgps/html5/section_7/7.9_allowability_of_costs_activities.htm [https://perma.cc
/LAF2-PLVT] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (describing National Institute of Health’s policies
for cost reimbursement through grants).
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constituted 2% of the U.S. gross domestic product (“GDP”) in the 1970s.89 In
the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government shouldered 70% of the funding for
basic research. The government scaled back to 61% as of 2004.90 And after the
financial crisis of 2008, the federal government enhanced federal funding for
research to $160 billion in 2010.91
Without grant funding, there would be no research for innovation, and there
would be no invention for patent filings and, consequently, no patents for
licensing.92 Moreover, in the past, firms like AT&T, DuPont, IBM, Merck, and
the like invested in fundamental scientific research.93 And the stock market then
valued corporate fundamental and scientific research by taking the long-term
view.94
Overall, in past decades the United States has invested three times as much as
any other economy in basic research in pursuit of scientific knowledge and
applied research to turn discoveries into useful technologies for industry and

89

Jahne, supra note 14 (“Seen from a longer perspective, federal spending on R&D as a
share of the gross domestic product has been in a long, slow slide from the 1970s, when it
peaked above 2 percent.”).
90
Jeffrey Mervis, Data Check: U.S. Government Share of Basic Research Funding Falls
Below 50%, SCI. MAG. (Mar. 9, 2017, 1:15 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news
/2017/03/data-check-us-government-share-basic-research-funding-falls-below-50
[https://perma.cc/M7SC-F2A8]).
91
Jahne, supra note 14 (“According to the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (AAAS), the federal government pays almost $140 billion a year for research and
development, down from a 2010 peak of about $160 billion, in constant dollars.”).
92
The connection among the Bayh-Dole Act, government funding, and public-private
sector R&D reliance allows new businesses to be created from university researchers and
patents licensed. See Joseph Allen, Academic Patent Licensing Helps Drive the U.S.
Economy, IPWATCHDOG (June 20, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/06/20
/academic-patent-licensing-helps-drive-u-s-economy/id=84778/
[https://perma.cc/U2GTYJEL] (describing impact of patent regulation on growing technology transfer in United
States).
93
See generally Ashis Arora et al., The Decline of Research in Corporate R&D, DUKE U.
SCH. L. (Apr. 2, 2017), https://law.duke.edu/sites/default/files/centers/cip/changinginnovation_arora-and-belenzon-final.pdf
[https://perma.cc/6BTZ-E4X4]
(describing
corporate shift from fundamental research to applied research).
94
See Ashish Arora, Sharon Belenzon & Andrea Patacconi, The Decline of Science in
Corporate R&D, 39 STRATEGIC MGMT. J. 3, 3 (2018) (finding that “value attributable to
scientific research has dropped” and that “[l]arge firms still value the golden eggs of science
(as reflected in patents) but seem to be increasingly unwilling to invest in the golden goose
itself (the internal scientific capabilities)”); Brad Plumer, American Companies Are Investing
Way Less in Science Than They Used To, VOX, https://www.vox.com/2015/2/4/7965967
/corporate-research-basic-science [https://perma.cc/EHJ6-YDY5] (last updated Feb. 4, 2015,
12:30 PM) (describing value placed on patents over applications by corporate America).
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society.95 Still, Europe and China have proved to be formidable competitors, and
thus innovation requires constant attention amidst fierce global competition.
C.

Tax Incentives for Innovation

The government also supports new innovation indirectly through various tax
incentives.96 In theory, tax incentives for innovation can encourage private
spending that would not otherwise occur in the private market. This is a good
thing because it is generally believed that research produces positive spillover
effects, such as attracting high value workers including engineers and scientists,
as well as luring capital essential for innovation.
Are special tax incentives for innovation justified? After all, an ideal tax
system should be neutral and avoid unnecessarily shaping economic behavior.97
Over the past half century, however, this neutrality principle has lost ground to
what might be termed “social engineering.” Today, there are many tax rules in
place that deliberately attempt to drive certain economic policies. These rules
create what are known as “tax expenditures.” In the common vernacular, a tax
expenditure might be called a tax break or a tax loophole. Whatever we call it, a
tax expenditure occurs when a rule causes the government to collect less revenue
than it would collect under a “normal” income tax.98 Social engineering through
tax expenditures is a prominent feature of our current income tax. The federal
government maintains what is known as the tax expenditures budget, a
compilation of all of the tax expenditures.99 It is estimated that federal income

95

Hal Sirkin, Justin Rose & Rahul Choraria, An Innovation-Led Boost for US
Manufacturing, BOS. CONSULTING GROUP (Apr. 17, 2017), https://www.bcg.com/publications
/2017/lean-innovation-led-boost-us-manufacturing.aspx [https://perma.cc/D7CJ-WPRJ].
96
Some commentators have suggested that special tax incentives are inappropriate. See,
e.g., Graetz & Doud, supra note 22, at 408 (arguing that “R&D tax incentives are inevitably
overbroad, rewarding spending that would have occurred without the tax break, and
subsidizing R&D that produces little or no positive spillover”); David Hasen, Taxation and
Innovation—A Sectorial Approach, 2017 U. ILL. L. REV. 1043, 1043.
97
An ideal tax system should also embrace principles of fairness and efficiency. See JOHN
A. MILLER & JEFFREY A. MAINE, THE FUNDAMENTALS OF FEDERAL TAXATION 5 (5th ed. 2018).
For an analysis of equity and efficiency in the tax system governing intellectual property, see
generally Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, Equity and Efficiency in Intellectual
Property Taxation, 76 BROOK. L. REV. 1 (2010).
98
This raises the question of what is a normal income tax. There is a great deal of room
for debate on this topic but, in general, we can say that a normal income tax would require
capitalization and recovery of those costs over the innovation’s useful life.
99
Congressional Budget and Impoundment Control Act of 1974, Pub. L. No. 93-344, 88
Stat. 297 (codified as amended at 2 U.S.C. §§ 601-688 (2012)) (requiring that list of “tax
expenditures” be included in budget).
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tax revenues are reduced by hundreds of billions of dollars annually as result of
tax expenditures.100
Historically, some of the biggest tax expenditures have been for special tax
rules designed to encourage new innovation.101 Tax incentives for innovation
generally fall within one of two categories: (1) those on the development side of
innovation—specifically, a tax deduction and tax credit for qualified research
spending; and (2) those on the back end of the innovation cycle—specifically, a
low tax rate on gain from the sale of successful innovation. In the United States,
individual inventors have historically benefited from both categories of tax
incentives. For example, an individual inventor could expense 100% of his or
her research costs when paid. If the research was successful and the inventor
later sold the invention, he or she could enjoy a low tax rate on any gain. In
contrast to individual inventors, corporate inventors have historically benefitted
from front-end tax incentives only (i.e., a tax deduction or credit for qualified
research spending). Corporations do not receive special rate treatment on their
gains. It is worthy to note that the United States, in contrast to many other
nations, has never adopted a reduced tax rate on royalty income from successful
innovation. As noted above, only gains from dispositions by individual inventors
have been accorded preferential rate treatment.
1.

Special Rate Treatment for Innovation Gains

The government began carving out special tax rules for innovation in the midtwentieth century. The first special rule for innovation (a back-end tax incentive)
was enacted in 1950. Prior to 1950, creators of both copyrighted works and
patented inventions were treated similarly for tax purposes. So long as their
works were not considered inventory (i.e., so long as they weren’t professional
creators), they would receive preferential capital gains treatment on later
dispositions. Capital gains treatment is preferential to ordinary income treatment
because capital gains are taxed at lower rates.102 To receive capital gains
treatment, one must sell a so-called “capital asset” held for more than one
year.103
100
See Tax Expenditures 2019, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 21-37 (Oct. 16, 2017),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-ExpendituresFY2019.pdf [https://perma.cc/3XEA-Q5LJ] (listing estimated tax expenditures for years
2017-2027).
101
See Tax Expenditures 2018, U.S. DEP’T TREASURY 22-37 (Sept. 28, 2016),
https://www.treasury.gov/resource-center/tax-policy/Documents/Tax-ExpendituresFY2018.pdf [https://perma.cc/6S86-AXL9] (detailing historical figures for expenditures).
102
Under current law, the maximum rate at which capital gains are taxed is 20% and the
maximum rate at which ordinary income is taxed is 37%, a significant rate differential. I.R.C.
§ 1 (2012). Over the years, as Congress has tinkered with both rate structures, the spread has
changed. All references to the Internal Revenue Code (“I.R.C.”) are to the I.R.C. of 1986, as
amended, unless otherwise noted.
103
Id. § 1222 (explaining differences between short-term and long-term capital gains).
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In 1948, President Dwight D. Eisenhower published a book of wartime
memoirs, Crusade in Europe, and sold it at a substantial gain. With the help of
a ruling by the Treasury Department that he was not a professional writer, 104 he
was able to enjoy capital gains treatment, saving about $400,000 in taxes.105
Congress responded by modifying the definition of a “capital asset” (that is an
asset eligible for preferential capital gains treatment) in the Revenue Act of
1950. The new definition excluded self-created copyrights; literary, musical, or
artistic compositions; and similar property.106 Under this change, which has been
called the “Eisenhower Amendment,” when a person sells a book or other artistic
work that is the product of his or her personal effort, his or her gain is taxed at
the higher rates applicable to ordinary income. 107 The stated policy behind the
change was that gains from personal efforts should be taxed as ordinary income
just as wages and salaries are taxed as ordinary income. 108
When Congress adopted this rule in 1950, it also considered treating as
ordinary income gains from the sale of an invention or patent by the occasional
inventor. Indeed, the House bill included the words “invention,” “patent,” and
“design” in types of self-created property that were excluded from the capital
asset definition and, thus, ineligible for preferential capital gains treatment.
Ultimately, however, the committee believed “that the desirability of fostering
104
Inventory is not considered a capital asset and is taxed at ordinary income tax rates.
Id. § 1221(a)(1).
105
DAVID PIETRUSZA, 1948: HARRY TRUMAN’S IMPROBABLE VICTORY AND THE YEAR THAT
TRANSFORMED AMERICA 201 (2011).
106
Under prior law, a person in the profession of writing books or creating other artistic
works had ordinary income when he or she sold the products of his or her work.
I.R.C. § 1221(a)(1) (2012) (excluding inventory from definition of capital asset). The 1950
tax law change had the effect of putting nonprofessional writers, artists, and photographers
on parity with professional writers, artists, and photographers who are subject to ordinary
rates on sales of their works.
107
Some uncertainty exists regarding whether the section 1221(a)(3) exclusion applies to
nonindividual creators, such as corporations whose employees or independent contractors
created the copyrights. The exclusion applies to “a taxpayer whose personal efforts created”
the property. See Martin Ice Cream Co. v. Comm’r, 110 T.C. 189, 230 (1998) (holding that
business records created by corporation’s employee did not fall within I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)).
108
Over the years, the Treasury Department and courts broadened the scope of the
provision to cover not only traditional copyrighted works and property eligible for copyright
protection, but also abstract ideas, such as cartoon characters or formats or ideas for television
or radio shows, that are not copyrightable per se. See Treas. Reg. § 1.1221-1(c)(1) (as
amended in 1975) (noting that “similar property” includes “a theatrical production, a radio
program, a newspaper cartoon strip, or any other property eligible for copyright protection”);
see also Cranford v. United States, 338 F.2d 379, 384 (Ct. Cl. 1964) (holding that “format for
radio or television program was ‘similar property’”); Stern v. United States, 164 F. Supp. 847,
851 (E.D. La. 1958) (addressing whether character “Francis,” the talking mule, was “similar
property” and therefore within scope of I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3)), aff’d per curiam, 262 F.2d 957
(5th Cir. 1959).
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the work of such inventors outweigh[ed] the small amount of additional revenue
which might be obtained under the House bill.”109 Accordingly, any references
to inventions, patents, and designs were eliminated. This was a strong signal that
innovation was to be accorded different, and preferential, treatment under the
law, at least for amateur inventors.110
While the 1950 tax law change signaled preferential treatment for patented
inventions, it only applied to amateur inventors, not to those who habitually
invented and sold their inventions. It also applied only to amateur inventors who
held their inventions sufficiently long enough (one year) before transferring their
rights in the invention. There was also some uncertainty as to whether capital
gains treatment should be available to non-professional inventors who sold their
inventions but who received contingent payments resembling royalties for their
inventions. Royalty payments under a license are taxed at ordinary income rates.
Four years later in 1954, Congress confirmed its desire to provide tax relief
to inventors by enacting a special rule for all individual inventors—whether
amateur or professional.111 Section 1235 of the Internal Revenue Code (“Code”)
provides statutory assurance to individual inventors that the sale of their
inventions will qualify for reduced capital gains rates, as opposed to ordinary
income tax rates. This is true even if the sale involves contingent payments,112
the transferor is a professional inventor and would otherwise have to report
ordinary income under general tax rules,113 and the invention has been held for
less than one year and would otherwise not meet the requisite one-year holding
period under the general capital gains provisions.114 By assuring individual

109

S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 44 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3098.
Although, “[i]t has been said that if President Eisenhower had realized similar profits
from a patented invention, copyrights would still be treated favorably and patents would have
been singled out for non-capital gains treatment.” JOHN HENRY MERRYMAN & ALBERT E.
ELSEN, LAW, ETHICS AND THE VISUAL ARTS 797 (4th ed. 2002).
111
See I.R.C. § 1235 (2012) (guaranteeing capital gains rates, as opposed to higher
ordinary income tax rates, for any transfer of all substantial rights to patent (or of undivided
interest in all such rights to patent) by certain holders to unrelated parties); S. R EP. NO. 831622, at 113 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747; H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337,
at A280 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4422.
112
See I.R.C. § 1235(a) (2012) (providing that section 1235 applies regardless of whether
payments received are payable periodically over period generally coterminous with
transferee’s use of patent or are contingent on productivity, use, or disposition of property
transferred).
113
See S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 113 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 4747
(stating that section 1235 can provide capital gains treatment to all inventors, whether amateur
or professional, regardless of how often they sell their patents); H.R. REP. NO. 83-1337, at
A280 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4422 (describing only method under
then-new Code by which inventor of patent could obtain capital gains on its sale).
114
See I.R.C. § 1223(3) (2012). Under general characterization rules, only long-term
capital gains are accorded preferential tax treatment. A long-term capital gain requires a
110
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inventors that sales of their inventions qualify for special tax treatment,
section 1235 is designed to encourage R&D that potentially leads to patentable
inventions.115 A stated policy goal underlying section 1235’s enactment was “to
provide an incentive to inventors to contribute to the welfare of the Nation.”116
2.

Tax Deduction for Qualified Research Spending

At the same time Congress enacted section 1235 as a back-end incentive to
stimulate economic growth and technological advancement, it enacted a very
important front-end tax incentive for innovation—section 174 of the Code.
Section 174 permits inventors to elect to expense immediately 100% of their
qualified research and experimental expenditures.117 The legislative goal was
clear—to encourage innovation activities. As noted by Daniel A. Reed, then
Chairman of the House Ways and Means Committee: “This provision will
greatly stimulate the search for new products and new inventions upon which
the future economic and military strength of our Nation depends. It will be
particularly valuable to small and growing businesses.”118 Small businesses, in
particular, were viewed as potential beneficiaries since section 174 does not
require that an inventor has already established himself in a trade or business to

holding period of more than one year. Id. Under the special characterization provision of
section 1235, however, the actual holding period becomes irrelevant.
115
It is worth noting that the special characterization safe harbor does not apply to
corporate inventors. Perhaps this was deliberate, as corporations do not receive preferential
rate treatment on their capital gains; all income (capital and ordinary) are taxed at the same
federal corporate income tax rate. I.R.C. § 11 (2012).
116
S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 439 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082.
117
I.R.C. § 174(a) (2012). A taxpayer could also use one of two other methods to account
for research and experimental expenditures. In lieu of currently deducting expenditures in the
year in which they were paid or incurred, a taxpayer could: (1) elect to treat the expenditures
as deferred expenses amortizable over a period of at least sixty months beginning in the month
that benefits are first realized from the expenditures; or (2) elect to amortize the expenditures
over ten years beginning in the tax year in which they are paid or incurred. Id. §§ 174(b),
59(e).
118
3 CONG. REC. 3425 (1954) (statement of Chairman Reed); see also H.R. REP. NO. 831337 (1954), as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4017, 4053; Donald C. Alexander, Research
and Experimental Expenditures Under the 1954 Code, 10 TAX L. REV. 549, 549 (1955)
(noting that primary reason for enacting section 174 was to create incentive for new products
and inventions through federal subsidy of R&D start-ups); William Natbony, The Tax
Incentives for Research and Development: An Analysis and a Proposal, 76 GEO. L.J. 347, 349
(1987) (explaining that Congress decided to provide taxpayers with option of immediate
deduction in order to encourage new R&D); Richard L. Parker, The Innocent Civilians in the
War Against NOL Trafficking: Section 382 and High-Tech Start-Up Companies, 9 VA. TAX
REV. 625, 694 (1990) (“The deduction election under section 174(a) is intended to encourage
research and development activities by allowing the cost of such activities to be used to offset
the income earned in the business at the earliest possible date.”).
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get the deduction. An inventor need only show that he has the intent and
capability to enter into business with the resulting technology. 119
Without this special rule, innovation costs could not be expensed in the same
year they are paid. This is because, since the inception of the modern income tax
in 1913, the Code has generally precluded a current deduction for so-called
“capital expenditures.” The term “capital expenditure” is tax jargon for any
expenditure that produces an asset lasting beyond the current tax period.120
Applying the asset capitalization rule to innovation costs can be challenging for
a number of reasons. It is often difficult to determine when research activities
result in an identifiable asset, the costs of which must be capitalized. Further,
because research may span several years with varying degrees of success, it is
often difficult to apportion costs if a particular project partly succeeds and partly
fails or when different and simultaneous research activities contribute in varying
degrees to the development of an asset or assets.121 By permitting immediate
deduction for qualified research spending, section 174 avoided these messy
accounting issues.122 More importantly, as noted above, section 174 was an
important incentive for taxpayers to engage in desirable research activities. 123

119
See Snow v. Comm’r, 416 U.S. 500, 502 (1974) (allowing section 174 deduction for
petitioner, despite limited partnership and lack of success); Kantor v. Comm’r, 998 F.2d 1514,
1518 (9th Cir. 1993) (construing language of section 174 broadly based on Snow).
120
Revenue Act of 1913, ch. 16, § II(B), 38 Stat. 114, 167 (outlining allowable business
expense deductions). For the current disallowance provisions, see 26 U.S.C.A. §§ 263, 263A
(Westlaw through Pub. L. No. 116-56).
121
See David S. Hudson, The Tax Concept of Research or Experimentation, 45 TAX LAW.
85, 88-89 (1991) (explaining why asset-capitalization rule is difficult to apply to R&D costs);
George Mundstock, Taxation of Business Intangible Capital, 135 U. PA. L. REV. 1179, 125859 (1987).
122
For a very brief period in tax history, well before the enactment of section 174, the
government permitted expensing of certain research costs:
In 1919, [the Treasury] promulgated a regulation that gave taxpayers the option of either
deducting or capitalizing expenses “for designs, drawings, patterns, models, or work of
an experimental nature [if] calculated to result in improvement[s] of [taxpayers’]
facilities or [taxpayers’] product[s].” Shortly thereafter, however, the Treasury deleted
the regulation because it found that certain taxpayers were enjoying double tax benefits
from their research—i.e., deducting research expenses when paid, but also capitalizing
them in the basis of developed patents thereby reducing gain on later sales.
Xuan-Thao Nguyen & Jeffrey A. Maine, The History of Intellectual Property Taxation:
Promoting Innovation and Other Intellectual Property Goals, 64 SMU L. REV. 795, 802 &
n.20 (2011) (footnotes omitted) (quoting Treas. Reg. 45, art. 168 (1919)). Following
withdrawal of the regulation, courts generally adhered to the asset-capitalization principle for
research costs. See generally Clem v. Comm’r, 10 T.C.M. (CCH) 1248 (1951); Claude Neon
Lights, Inc. v. Comm’r, 35 B.T.A. 424 (1937); Hazeltine Corp. v. Comm’r, 32 B.T.A. 110
(1935), rev’d, 89 F.2d 513 (3d Cir. 1937).
123
I.R.C. § 263(a)(1)(B) (2012) (providing that capitalization rules under section 263(a)
do not apply to research or experimental expenditures deductible under section 174(a)).
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Congress left to the Treasury Department the job of defining which R&D
expenditures qualify for expensing. The regulations define qualified costs as all
costs incurred in the experimental or laboratory sense related to the development
or improvement of a product.124 In particular, qualifying costs are those incurred
for activities intended to discover information that would eliminate uncertainty
concerning the development or improvement of a product.125 Examples of
qualifying costs include salaries for those engaged in research, amounts incurred
to operate and maintain research facilities (such as utilities, depreciation, and
rent), and expenditures for materials and supplies used and consumed in the
course of research (including amounts incurred in conducting trials). 126
Over the years, the Treasury Department expanded the scope of research costs
that qualified for current deduction under section 174—most recently in 1994127
and 2014.128 Perhaps the most significant enhancement of the section 174
deduction was its extension to computer software development costs. In
administrative guidance, the IRS concluded that all costs of developing
computer software may be deducted currently under section 174.129 The
government adopts a broad definition of “computer software” for deduction
purposes. Because of this broad definition, section 174 principles apply not just
to software development costs that would otherwise constitute research or
experimental expenditures for purposes of section 174, but more importantly to
software development costs that do not satisfy the definition of research and
experimental expenditures under section 174.130
All of the tax incentives for innovation discussed above were enacted in the
1950s. To recap, on the front-end of the innovation cycle, Congress enacted a
special deduction permitting 100% expensing of qualified innovation costs.
124
Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (as amended in 2014) (“The term research or experimental
expenditures, as used in section 174, means expenditures incurred in connection with the
taxpayer’s trade or business which represent research and development costs in the
experimental or laboratory sense.”).
125
Id.
126
Treas. Reg. § 1.174-4(c) (1960). The definition of research and experimental
expenditures also includes costs of obtaining a patent, such as attorney’s fees incurred in
making and perfecting a patent. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (as amended in 2014). For
exclusions, see Id. § 1.174-2(a)(6).
127
See Research and Experimental Expenditures, 59 Fed. Reg. 50,159, 50,160 (Oct. 3,
1994) (describing intent to clarify definition of “research or experimental expenditures” under
section 174).
128
See Research Expenditures, 79 Fed. Reg. 42,193, 42,193 (July 21, 2014) (“This
document contains final regulations to amend the definition of research and experimental
expenditures under section 174 of the Internal Revenue Code (Code).”).
129
Rev. Proc. 69-21, 1969-2 C.B. 303 (establishing definition and scope of “computer
software” for expensing purposes), updated by Rev. Proc. 2000-50, 2000-2 C.B. 601.
130
Id. (expanding definition scope of coverage for “computer software” past that of section
174).
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Later, the Treasury and the IRS expanded the types of innovation eligible for
expensing, including software development. On the back end of the innovation
cycle, Congress enacted rules to ensure individual inventors would receive
preferential capital gains rate treatment on the sales of their inventions—first the
Eisenhower Amendment to the capital asset definition (in 1950) and later section
1235 (in 1954).131 Interestingly, these tax policy tools were adopted around the
same time as adoption of the Patent Code (1952), a strong signal of government
support for innovation.
3.

Tax Credit for Increases in Research Spending

Under the tax incentives discussed above, an inventor may deduct research
costs and then enjoy a low capital gains tax on the later sale of the resulting
innovation. Three decades after Congress created these powerful tax incentives
for innovation, it enacted another tax incentive—a special tax credit (“STC”) for
incremental increases in research and spending. It should be noted that tax
credits differ from tax deductions in one important way. Tax deductions reduce
income before the tax rate is applied, whereas tax credits reduce tax liability
dollar for dollar. Thus, a credit is worth more to a taxpayer since a deduction
only reduces tax liability in proportion to the taxpayer’s top marginal tax rate.
For this reason, the STC was seen as a more powerful tool in incentivizing
increased research activity within the United States.
The STC was enacted in 1981.132 Codified in section 41 of the Code, the STC
is incremental: it is equal to a certain percentage (20%) of qualified research
spending above a “base amount”—generally, a firm’s normal level of
investment in R&D.133 Innovators, therefore, can only benefit from it if they
131
Other tax benefits for innovation slowly emerged. For example, section 174 deductions,
unlike tax depreciation deductions, do not have to be recaptured and reported as ordinary
income on later disposition of the property. Rev. Rul. 85-186, 1985-2 C.B. 84. As further
example, inventions sold on a deferred payment basis are not subject to interest imputation
rules under the Code (assuming section 1235 applies). I.R.C. §§ 483(d)(4), 1274(c)(3)(E)
(2012) (outlining effect on disposition of transferring property).
132
Economic Recovery Tax Act of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-34, § 221(a), 95 Stat. 172, 241
(establishing original research credit at I.R.C. § 44F (1981)). In its current form, the research
credit consists of three components: (1) 20% of the excess of the “qualified research expenses”
for the taxable year over a “base amount”; (2) 20% of the “basic research payments” made
during the year to universities and other qualified organizations; and (3) 20% of payments
made during the year to an energy research consortium for qualified energy research. I.R.C.
§ 41(a)(1)-(3) (2012). The first component, commonly known as the general research credit
or the incremental research credit, is the main focus of this article.
133
The base amount (i.e., normal level of R&D investment) is a “fixed-base percentage”
of the taxpayer’s average annual gross receipts for the four preceding tax years. I.R.C.
§ 41(c)(1)(A)-(B) (2012). For established firms, the fixed-base percentage is generally based
on a ratio of the taxpayer’s qualified research expenses to its gross receipts for years 1984 to
1988, capped at 16%. Id. § 41(c)(3)(B). For start-up firms, the fixed-base percentage is set at
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increase their research spending over time.134 In theory, the STC lowers the cost
of research and firms respond to the reduced price by spending more. There is
some data and economic research, albeit limited, on the credit’s effectiveness in
increasing research spending by private businesses in the United States. One
study found that for every one dollar of the credit, firms spend an additional one
dollar or more on research.135 This suggests that the credit is as cost effective as
a direct federal research grant.The STC’s reformulation over the years has
limited the types of research for which the credit is available. Today, not all costs
that qualify for the section 174 deduction qualify for the STC due to special
regulatory requirements and exceptions.136 In addition to meeting the
requirements for deductibility under section 174, two additional requirements
must be met. First, the research must be undertaken for the purpose of
discovering information that is technological in nature.137 Second, substantially
all of the research activities must constitute elements of a process of
experimentation for functional aspects, performance, reliability, or quality of a
business component.138 Both of these requirements have been the source of
considerable controversy, in large part due to the regulations under section 41,
which have a checkered past.139 The main controversy over the years has been
3% during the firm’s first five tax years with spending on qualified research and gross receipts.
Id. § 41(c)(3)(B)(ii)(I). In no event shall the base amount be less than 50% of the qualified
research expenses for the credit year. Id. § 41(c)(2).
134
It might be possible for research expenses to qualify for both the STC and section 174
tax deduction discussed above. See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text. In such a case,
deductions under section 174 must be reduced by the extent to which the STC is taken. I.R.C.
§ 280C(c)(1) (2012) (“No deduction shall be allowed for that portion of the qualified research
expenses (as defined in section 41(b)) or basic research expenses (as defined in section
41(e)(2)) otherwise allowable as a deduction for the taxable year which is equal to the amount
of the credit determined for such taxable year under section 41(a).”).
135
See GUENTHER, supra note 23, at 19 (“[E]conomists have relied on . . . estimating the
additional qualified research (if any) stimulated by the regular credit, and comparing the dollar
value of that gain with the tax revenue lost because of the credit. Such an approach compares
the direct benefits (i.e., added research investment) with the direct costs (revenue loss) of the
regular credit. . . . If the ratio of benefits to cost is greater than one, then the credit can be seen
as a more cost-effective way to boost research than direct research subsidies; if it is less than
one, then funding the research directly would be more cost effective.”). A 2000 study by
economists Bronwyn Hall and John Van Reenan found that from 1981 to 1991 the U.S.
research credit generated an additional dollar in research for every dollar lost in tax revenue.
Bronwyn Hall & John Van Reenen, How Effective Are Fiscal Incentives for R&D? A Review
of the Evidence, 29 RES. POL’Y 449, 466 (2000).
136
I.R.C. § 41(d)(1) (2012).
137
Id. § 41(d)(1)(B).
138
Id. § 41(d)(1)(C).
139
In January 2001, the Treasury issued a set of final regulations relating to the
computation of the research credit and the definition of qualified research. See Credit for
Increasing Research Activities, 66 Fed. Reg. 280, 280 (Jan. 3, 2001). Shortly thereafter,
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whether these requirements add to the section 174 requirements discussed
earlier, or whether they merely restate them.140 However, these issues have since
been largely resolved.141
As further limitation, section 41 specifically excludes a long list of research
activities from eligibility for the STC.142 One notable exclusion relates to
development of internal-use software. Specifically, computer software
developed for internal use by the taxpayer is excluded,143 unless the internal-use
software satisfies a high threshold of innovation test outlined in the
regulations.144
A major limitation to the STC was its temporary nature. Until recently, the
research credit was continually renewed as a temporary provision, which made
it very difficult for firms to plan research activities. 145 In 2015, Congress made

however, the Treasury and IRS announced that these final regulations were suspended for
further review and comment. See I.R.S. Notice 2001-19, 2001-10 I.R.B. 784 (“On January 3,
2001, the Treasury Department published final regulations relating to the computation of the
research credit under § 41(c) . . . . The Treasury Department and the Internal Revenue Service
will review these final regulations.” (citation omitted)). In December 2001, the Treasury
issued a new set of proposed regulations. See Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 66
Fed. Reg. 66,362, 66,362 (Dec. 26, 2001). Three years later, the Treasury issued final
regulations under section 41. See Credit for Increasing Research Activities, 69 Fed. Reg. 22,
22 (Jan. 2, 2004).
140
See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text.
141
Current regulations put these issues to rest. For example, they clarify that there is no
“discovery” requirement in the research credit regulations separate and apart from that already
required under section 174. Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(a)(2) (as amended in 2016) (requiring
research to be “treated as expenses under section 174”). Also, they expand on the definition
of “technological in nature.” Id. § 1.41-4(a)(4) (“[I]nformation is technological in nature if
the process of experimentation used to discover such information fundamentally relies on
principles of the physical or biological sciences, engineering, or computer science.”).
142
See I.R.C. § 41(d)(4) (2012).
143
Id. § 41(d)(4)(E) (excluding “computer software which is developed by (or for the
benefit of) the taxpayer primarily for internal use by the taxpayer” from the definition of
qualified research, except “to the extent provided in regulations”).
144
Treas. Reg. § 1.41-4(c)(6) (as amended in 2016). This exception for internal-use
software was the subject of considerable controversy for years. One issue concerned the
definition of “internal-use” software. Another issue centered around what types of internaluse software should be considered to satisfy the high threshold of innovation test. It took a
while, but regulations were finally issued in 2016 resolving these issues. See Credit for
Increasing Research Activities, 81 Fed. Reg. 68,299, 68,299 (Oct. 4, 2016) (“This document
contains final regulations concerning the application of the credit for increasing research
activities.”).
145
See, e.g., I.R.C. § 41(h)(1) (2012) (“This section shall not apply to any amount paid or
incurred after June 30, 1995 . . . .”).
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the STC permanent.146 This was probably the most significant enhancement to
the STC since its adoption in 1981.
The U.S. tax incentives for innovation enacted in the early 1950s and early
1980s clearly reflect a policy decision to incentivize the development of patented
inventions.147 The incentives for patents and patent-like property do not apply to
other forms of intellectual property, such as copyrights and trademarks. 148 With
respect to copyright development, for example, creation costs must generally be
capitalized.149 And, under the Eisenhower Amendment discussed earlier, when
an individual copyright creator disposes of her work, she must pay tax on gain
at the higher rates applicable to ordinary income.150
Exceptions to these rules are limited. For example, under a special rule
enacted in 1988, certain individual copyright creators (freelance writers,
photographers, and artists, as defined in the Code) can deduct their “qualified
creative expenses” if they are engaged in an active trade or business, but they
cannot deduct fees paid to the Copyright Office to obtain copyright protections
on the developed product.151 Another special rule enacted in 2005 permits
146

Consolidated Appropriations Act of 2016, Pub. L. No. 114-113, div. Q, tit. I, § 121,
129 Stat. 3049-52 (“Section 41 is amended by striking subsection (h).”).
147
Trade secrets and know-how typically fall within the scope of these incentives. See
Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1) (as amended in 2014) (“The term [research or experimental
expenditures] includes generally all such costs incident to the development of an experimental
or pilot model, a plant process, a product, a formula, an invention, or similar property, and the
improvement of already existing property of the type mentioned.”). Section 1235 regulations
provide that no patent or patent application need be currently in existence, suggesting that an
inventor can receive capital gain treatment for patentable, or patent-like, property. Treas. Reg.
§ 1.1235-2(a) (as amended in 1980) (“It is not necessary that the patent or patent application
for the invention be in existence if the requirements of section 1235 are otherwise met”); see
also Gilson v. Comm’r, 48 T.C.M. (CCH) 922, 927 (1984) (allowing patent tax treatment
even though only two of eight designs were patented).
148
See, e.g., Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(6) (as amended in 2014) (prohibiting deduction of
expenditures for “literary, historical, or similar projects”); S. REP. NO. 83-1622, at 439 (1954),
as reprinted in 1954 U.S.C.C.A.N. 4621, 5082 (noting tax incentive “does not apply to a
property right in an invention differing from the monopoly rights evidenced by a patent”).
149
See I.R.C. § 263A (2012) (requiring capitalization of expenditures in connection with
copyrightable subject matter); Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(b)(1)(iii) (2004) (requiring
capitalization of costs of creating any “separate and distinct intangible asset”); id. § 1.263(a)4(d)(5) (requiring capitalization of costs of obtaining rights from governmental agency).
150
See supra notes 103-108 and accompanying text. An exception exists for sales of
musical compositions and copyrights thereon, which are eligible for capital gains rate
treatment under a special elective provision. I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2012) (“At the election of
the taxpayer, paragraphs (1) and (3) of subsection (a) shall not apply to musical compositions
or copyrights in musical works sold or exchanged by a taxpayer described in subsection
(a)(3).”).
151
Treas. Reg. § 1.263(a)-4(d)(5)(i) (2004) (“A taxpayer must capitalize amounts paid to
a governmental agency to obtain, renew, renegotiate, or upgrade its rights under a

1720

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1687

songwriters, but not other copyright creators, to elect to receive capital gains
treatment on the sale of their songs.152 These exceptions, however, were not
adopted as tax incentives to encourage copyright creation; they were relief
provisions. The special deduction for freelance writers, photographers, and
artists was not to promote freelance activities but rather to relieve such
individuals from the burden of the capitalization rules, especially when their
activities may not generate income for years.153 The special capital gains
provision for songwriters was not adopted to encourage creation of musical
compositions, but rather to provide relief to songwriters who, compared to other
copyright creators, have quite low income that often comes in spurts. 154
In contrast to copyright creation, innovation has benefited from a long history
of special tax incentives, and based on analysis of tax expenditures, numerous
innovators have benefited from these incentives. In fact, the front-end incentives
(deduction and credit) represent some of the largest business tax expenditures
for the U.S. government. Expensing of research and experimentation
expenditures (the front-end incentive affected by recent tax law change) was
expected to cost the government $119 billion over a ten-year period from 2018
to 2027.155 The credit for increasing research activities (the front-end incentive
trademark . . . .”). These rules do not apply to patent inventors. Treas. Reg. § 1.174-2(a)(1)
(as amended in 2014) (allowing for current deduction of “costs of obtaining a patent, such as
attorneys’ fees expended in making and perfecting a patent application”).
152
Tax Increase Prevention and Reconciliation Act of 2005, Pub. L. No. 109-222,
§ 204(a)(3), 120 Stat. 345, 350 (2006) (codified at I.R.C. § 1221(b)(3) (2012)) (amended
2017).
153
See H.R. REP. NO. 100-1104, at 145 (1988) (Conf. Rep.), as reprinted in 1988
U.S.C.C.A.N. 5048, 5205 (“The House bill exempts from the application of the uniform
capitalization rules any otherwise deductible expense that is paid or incurred by an individual
engaged in the business of being a writer, photographer, or artist.”).
154
See Brady Mullins, Music to Songwriters’ Ears: Lower Taxes; Country Artists’ Group
Presses Lawmakers to Slash the Levy on Lyricists, WALL STREET J., Nov. 29, 2005, at A4
(“Songwriters . . . must be paid royalties immediately after they are collected. Thus, unlike an
author of a novel, who could arrange to spread out his or her payments over a number of years,
a songwriter is more vulnerable to fewer, large payouts—and more of a tax hit.”). For criticism
of this argument and government response, see James Edward Maule, I Sing a Song of Taxes,
a Pocketful of Cries, MAULEDAGAIN BLOG (Nov. 30, 2005, 10:39 AM),
http://mauledagain.blogsport.com/2005_11_01_archive.html
[https://perma.cc/A7QX35KP] (“Apparently song writers think that when they sell a song they should be taxed just
as if they sold a stock. The logic fails, however, because the same argument can be made by
a book author. Or a furniture maker. Or a person who grows fruits and vegetables and sells
them at a truck stop. The fact that the services are embodied in a self-produced item or an
item into which a person’s services have been injected does not make the sale a sale of an
investment.”).
155
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., JCX-67-17, ESTIMATED BUDGET EFFECTS
OF THE CONFERENCE AGREEMENT FOR H.R. 1, THE “TAX CUT AND JOBS ACT,” FISCAL YEARS
2018-2027, at 3 (2017); see also Tax Expenditures 2019, supra note 100, at tbls.1, 3.
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unaffected by recent tax law change) was expected to cost the government $163
billion in tax revenues over the same ten-year period.156
II.
A.

THE ATTACK ON AMERICAN INNOVATION

Weakening of the Patent System Under the Disguise of Innovation

A new narrative of innovation has overtaken the United States in the past
decade. Under this narrative, innovation demands a weaker patent system where
patent eligibility would not be available for inventions in business methods,
software, medical diagnostics, and personalized medicine. This new narrative
dominates the halls of Congress, the Supreme Court,157 the media, and academic
publications and conferences.158 By weakening the patent system, this attack
aims to close the door on patent inclusion.
The disagreement in patent law interpretation between the Supreme Court and
Federal Circuit has escalated in this past decade.159 In the last ten years, the
Supreme Court has systematically destroyed the Federal Circuit’s inclusion of
inventions in new innovative technologies. For example, in 2010, in Bilski v.
Kappos,160 the Court overturned the Federal Circuit’s “useful, concrete and
tangible result” as the sole test for business methods and software inventions,
narrowing the door of patentable subject matter.161 Four years later, in Alice
Corp. v. CLS Bank International,162 the Court nailed the coffin shut on
patentability for business method and software innovations. 163 As a result, patent
156

Tax Expenditures 2019, supra note 100, at tbls.1, 3.
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 427 (2007) (“[A]s progress
beginning from higher levels of achievement is expected in the normal course, the results of
ordinary innovation are not the subject of exclusive rights under the patent laws. Were it
otherwise patents might stifle, rather than promote, the progress of useful arts.”).
158
Dana Remus Irwin, Paradise Lost in Patent Law? Changing Visions of Technology in
the Subject Matter Inquiry, 60 FLA. L. REV. 775, 779 n.24 (2008) (listing scholars and their
scholarship opposing patent inclusion in name of innovation).
159
See generally J. Jonas Anderson, Patent Dialogue, 92 N.C. L. REV. 1049, 1076-83
(2014) (“The unique relationship between the Federal Circuit and the Supreme Court has led
to a new, somewhat contentious form of dialogue between the two courts.”); Timothy R.
Holbrook, Explaining the Supreme Court’s Interest in Patent Law, 3 IP THEORY 62, 63-64
(2013) (“Starting in around 2000, the Supreme Court became active, if not even hyperactive,
in patent law.”).
160
561 U.S. 593 (2010).
161
Id. at 612 (“Nothing in today’s opinion should be read as endorsing the Federal
Circuit’s past interpretations of § 101.”).
162
573 U.S. 208 (2014).
163
Id. at 2351-52 (holding that financial risk-management software is “drawn to the
abstract idea of intermediated settlement, and that merely requiring generic computer
implementation fails to transform that abstract idea into a patent-eligible invention”); see also
Intellectual Ventures I LLC v. Symantec Corp., 838 F.3d 1307, 1325 (Fed. Cir. 2016) (Mayer,
157
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filings in these fields have dropped drastically. 164 Companies owning existing
patents in these fields had to write down the value of their portfolios.165 And the
secondary market for software and business method patents diminished for fear
of invalidation under Alice.166
Wielding its enormous power again in interpreting patentability subject
matter under Section 101, the Supreme Court in 2012 turned its attention to
medical diagnostics and personalized medicine in Mayo Collaborative Services
v. Prometheus Laboratories, Inc.,167 removing patent eligibility in this
economically important sector.168 A year later, the Court focused on patent
J., concurring) (“Alice sounded the death knell for software patents. . . . [A]ll software
implemented on a standard computer should be deemed categorically outside the bounds of
section 101.”).
164
In one year after the Alice decision, members of the patent bar noted drastic changes.
See Where Do We Stand One Year After Alice?, LAW360 (June 17, 2015, 8:27 PM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/668773 (“No U.S. Supreme Court patent case has ever had
so large an effect in so short a time as Alice Corp. Pty. Ltd. v. CLS Bank Int’l.” (quoting
Kenneth Adamo, Kirkland & Ellis LLP)); id. (“At the USPTO the number of rejections under
35 USC §101 skyrocketed since Alice. The number of business method patents allowed by
the USPTO dropped significantly.” (quoting Richard Baker, New England Intellectual
Property LLC)); id. (“[S]tudies have indicated that the number of business method patents
issued have declined by greater than 60 percent over similar pre-Alice periods, and the number
of issued software patents have declined by approximately 15 percent. In the courts, Alice
Section 101 motions are being granted almost 75 percent of the time, and one can extrapolate
that the courts will address about 150 Alice motions in the next 12 months.” (quoting Garrard
R. Beeney, Sullivan & Cromwell LLP)).
165
Id. (“[P]ublic companies with business method or software patents on their books will
have to consider writing down the value of their portfolios to Alice. The valuations of
companies that copy competitor’s software will increase, and the value of, and investment in,
first mover companies in the software and business method arts will continue to decrease.”
(quoting Richard Baker, New England Intellectual Property LLC)).
166
Id. (“The secondary market for software and business method patents dried up in the
past year as buyers avoid the risks of ineligibility under §101.” (quoting Richard Baker, New
England Intellectual Property LLC)).
167
566 U.S. 66 (2012).
168
Id. at 72 (“We must determine whether the claimed processes have transformed these
unpatentable natural laws into patent-eligible applications of those laws. We conclude that
they have not done so and that therefore the processes are not patentable.”). Commentators
have expressed their extreme frustration. See, e.g., Gene Quinn, Killing Industry: The
Supreme Court Blows Mayo v. Prometheus, IPWATCHDOG (Mar. 20, 2012),
http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2012/03/20/supreme-court-mayo-v-prometheus/id=22920/
[https://perma.cc/E4EX-MUB8] (“Those in the biotech, medical diagnostics, and
pharmaceutical industries have just been taken out behind the woodshed and summarily
executed by the Supreme Court this morning. An enormous number of patents will now have
no enforceable claims. Hundreds of billions of dollars in corporate value has been erased.”).
The decision has also been condemned by scholars. See, e.g., Christopher M. Holman, The
Mayo Framework Is Bad for Your Health, 23 GEO. MASON L. REV. 901, 911 (2016) (“Justice
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eligibility in life sciences in Ass’n of Molecular Pathology v. Myriad
Genetics,169 further eliminating patent protection in the personalized medicine
fields.170 In these two cases, the Court expanded the “judicial exceptions” to
patent eligibility, causing the creation of many new innovations without patent
protection.171 The words “anything under the sun that is made by man,” once
uttered by the Court thirty years ago in reference to the field of life sciences,
were turned upside down.172 The Court’s decisions wreaked so much havoc on
the patent system that David Kappos, USPTO Director from 2009 to 2013, urged
Congress to repeal section 101 of the Patent Act.173 In fact, the Intellectual

Breyer emphasized the critical role he saw for the patent eligibility doctrine in preventing
patents from tying up the fundamental building blocks of science and technological
innovation. . . . Unfortunately, as discussed in more detail below, [his] unnecessarily broad
language seems to be having exactly the opposite effect, denying patent protection for truly
meritorious inventions that might not adequately develop without the patent incentive.”).
169
569 U.S. 576 (2013).
170
Id. at 580 (“[W]e hold that a naturally occurring DNA segment is a product of nature
and not patent eligible merely because it has been isolated . . . .”); see also Berand Chao &
Amy Mapes, An Early Look at Mayo’s Impact on Personalized Medicine, 2016 PATENTLY-O
PAT. L.J., no. 1, 2016, at 10, 12 (“[Of] the 294 applications, 520 office actions were issued
between August 2007 and March 2016 . . . . Of those office actions, 188 were issued preMayo and 332 were issued post-Mayo. Only 15.9% of the office actions issued pre-Mayo had
rejections under section 101 for subject matter eligibility. In contrast, 86.4% of the office
actions issued post-Mayo had rejections under section 101 for subject matter eligibility.”);
Gene Quinn, Mayo v. Prometheus: A Lawless Decision by an Omnipotent Court Wreaking
Havoc on Patents, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 23, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com/2017/01/23
/mayo-v-prometheus-lawless-decision-wreaking-havoc-patents/id=77438/ [https://perma.cc
/R45K-CSJU] (“Only the Supreme Court’s decision in Association of Molecular Pathology
v. Myriad Genetics comes close to Mayo in terms of intellectual dishonesty.”).
171
Mark S. Cohen & Jonathan Passner, Five Years After Mayo v. Prometheus: Where Do
We Go from Here, LEXOLOGY (June 19, 2017), https://www.lexology.com/library
/detail.aspx?g=d3719a0f-47dd-455c-9579-551c848ea276
[https://perma.cc/6AS5-S7KF]
(noting difficulty of obtaining and enforcing patents in natural products and diagnostic
methods).
172
Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (quoting S. REP. NO. 82-1979, at 5
(1952), as reprinted in 1952 U.S.C.C.A.N. 2394, 2399).
173
Ryan Davis, Kappos Calls for Abolition of Section 101 of Patent Act, LAW360 (Apr.
12, 2016, 4:32 PM), https://www.law360.com/articles/783604/kappos-calls-for-abolition-ofsection-101-of-patent-act (“The former director of the U.S. Patent and Trademark Office on
Monday called for the abolition of Section 101 of the Patent Act, which sets limits on patenteligible subject matter, saying decisions like Alice on the issue are a ‘real mess’ and threaten
patent protection for key U.S. industries.”); see also Cohen & Passner, supra note 171 (noting
that Court in Diamond “observed there that that [sic] Congress intended the statute
establishing what can be patented to ‘include anything under the sun that is made by man,’”
and “that case was the last word from the Supreme Court in the life sciences on the question
of what is patent-eligible”).
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Property Owners Association adopted a resolution to support legislation to
reverse the Court’s attack on innovation.174
In attacking innovation, the Court’s decisions have been criticized by many
for confusing the idea of patentability,175 being judicially dishonest,176 and
demonstrating a misunderstanding of patent law.177 Specifically, the Court
erroneously relied on the “inventive concept” standard of section 103 in
analyzing section 101, destroying the distinct three doors of patent law that
Judge Rich had carefully separated in the 1952 Patent Code.178 Sadly, Judge
Rich years ago predicted this misinterpretation of section 101, an interpretation
in direct conflict with the intent of the drafters of the 1952 Patent Code.179
Additionally, and certainly more critically, the Court’s recent line of patent

174

INTELL. PROP. OWNERS ASS’N , PROPOSED AMENDMENTS TO PATENT ELIGIBLE SUBJECT
MATTER UNDER 35 U.S.C. § 101, at 1 (2017), http://www.ipo.org/wpcontent/uploads/2017/02/20170207_IPO-101-TF-Proposed-Amendments-and-Report.pdf
[https://perma.cc/N4L4-STVG].
175
Taylor, supra note 40, at 159 (“[T]he current approach to determining patent eligibility
confuses the relevant policy concerns underlying numerous discrete patent law doctrines.”).
176
Holman, supra note 168, at 912 (“The Mayo Framework purports to follow principles
set forth in the first wave of patent-eligibility decisions . . . . The Supreme Court has left it to
the lower courts to grapple with the critical question of how much ‘what else’ is ‘enough’ to
cross over the threshold and into the realm of patent eligibility. It has provided little in the
way of concrete guidance . . . .”).
177
Greg Reilly, How Can the Supreme Court Not “Understand” Patent Law?, 16 CHI.KENT J. INTELL. PROP. 292, 295-301 (2017) (noting comments relating to Supreme Court’s
misunderstanding of patent law and responding to criticism).
178
David K. Mroz & Umber Aggarwal, Patent Law Could Use Another Judge Rich Right
Now, IP LITIGATOR, Nov./Dec. 2017, at 8, 8 (“[T]he Patent Act of 1952 carefully crafted a
balance between Section 101 and Section 103. Section 101 provided a coarse filter that was
satisfied as long as the claimed invention was not ‘frivolous’ or ‘worthless,’ and Section 103
provided a more stringent test for patentability.” (footnote omitted)); see also 35 U.S.C. § 101
(2012) (“Whoever invents or discovers any new and useful process, machine, manufacture,
or composition of matter, or any new and useful improvement thereof, may obtain a patent
therefor, subject to the conditions and requirements of this title.”); id. § 103 (“A patent for a
claimed invention may not be obtained . . . if the differences between the claimed invention
and the prior art are such that the claimed invention as a whole would have been obvious
before the effective filing date of the claimed invention to a person having ordinary skill in
the art to which the claimed invention pertains.”).
179
Rich, supra note 31, at 63 (“The doctrine of literalness has the weakness of leading to
the misinterpretation, if the interpreter assumes a meaning different from that given to a term
by the legislative drafter. True interpretation, therefore, requires that words in a statute be
taken in the sense which the writers attached to them, unless the intent of someone other than
the writer is sought.”); see also Mroz & Aggarwal, supra note 178, at 9 (“Judge Rich
prophetically warned that something like this could happen if the Patent Act of 1952 was
construed out of context with what the drafters intended.”).
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eligibility cases brings back pre-1952 instability and uncertainty to modern
patent law.180
Consistent with the new philosophy of patent exclusion, the Supreme Court
has flexed its muscles in other areas of patent law, overturning law well
established by the Federal Circuit.181 From injunctive remedy,182 to patent
exhaustion,183 to divided infringement,184 to the obviousness test,185 the Supreme
Court has significantly altered the patent landscape.186 In the obviousness
requirement, the Court has made it much more difficult for innovators to pass

180
Mroz & Aggarwal, supra note 178, at 9 (“[T]he Supreme Court has returned the patent
system to its pre-1952 state of uncertainty . . . and the patent system has suffered because of
it, as patent prosecutors are unsure how to write claims, and litigants are unsure if asserted
claims will survive Section 101 challenges in litigation.”); Neal Solomon, The Disintegration
of the American Patent System, IPWATCHDOG (Jan. 26, 2017), http://www.ipwatchdog.com
/2017/01/26/disintegration-american-patent-system/id=77594/
[https://perma.cc/NGF7FEJ5] (“[A]n activist U.S. Supreme Court supplied a series of decisions from 2006 to 2016
that substantially eroded patent rights [that] had a profound adverse effect on the economy.”).
181
See, e.g., KSR Int’l Co. v. Teleflex Inc., 550 U.S. 398, 419 (2007) (rejecting Federal
Circuit’s “rigid” teaching, suggestion, and motivation test).
182
See eBay Inc. v. MercExchange, L.L.C., 547 U.S. 388, 390 (2006) (“Ordinarily, a
federal court considering whether to award permanent injunctive relief to a prevailing plaintiff
applies the four-factor test historically employed by courts of equity. . . . We agree and,
accordingly, vacate the judgment of the Court of Appeals.”).
183
Quanta Comput., Inc. v. LG Elecs., Inc., 553 U.S. 617, 621 (2008) (“Because the
exhaustion doctrine applies to method patents, and because the license authorizes the sale of
components that substantially embody the patents in suit, the sale exhausted the patents.”).
184
Limelight Networks, Inc. v. Akami Techs., Inc., 572 U.S. 915, 917 (2014) (“This case
presents the question whether a defendant may be liable for inducing infringement of a patent
under 35 U.S.C. § 271(b) when no one has directly infringed the patent under § 271(a) or any
other statutory provision. The statutory text and structure and our prior case law require that
we answer this question in the negative. We accordingly reverse the Federal Circuit, which
reached the opposite conclusion.”); see also W. Keith Robinson, Economic Theory, Divided
Infringement, and Enforcing Interactive Patents, 67 FLA. L. REV. 1961, 1971 (2015)
(discussing Federal Circuit’s approach to divided infringement before Supreme Court
rendered approach moot).
185
KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 419.
186
See generally Anderson, supra note 159, at 1076-83 (describing patent law changes
made by Supreme Court since 2000); Holbrook, supra note 159, at 63 (“[T]he Supreme
Court’s intervention is no longer on the periphery of patent law. The cases they have decided
go right to the substance of patent law: the doctrine of equivalents and prosecution history
estoppel, subject matter eligibility, induced infringement, the statutory experimental use
defense, to name but a few.” (footnotes omitted)); Steven Seidenberg, US Perspectives:
Troubled Circuit Hobbles US Patent System, INTELL. PROP. WATCH (July 31, 2017),
http://www.ip-watch.org/2017/07/31/troubled-federal-circuit-hobbles-us-patent-system/
[https://perma.cc/9J8V-UX4U].

1726

BOSTON UNIVERSITY LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 99:1687

the obviousness muster,187 thus increasing the level of unpredictability. 188 The
Court announced that “ordinary innovation” has no place in receiving legal
protection under the patent system.189 “Ordinary innovation” losers include
independent inventors, research universities, and startups whose most important
assets are patents and who often rely on these intangible assets to attract earlystage investors.190 Because these losers cannot obtain and enforce their patents,
they cannot rely on them when seeking funding for further innovation. 191
As such, these decisions have alarmed members of the investment
community.192 The weakening of the patent system has negatively impacted

187
Rexford Johnson & Matthew Whipple, KSR and the Rising Bar of Innovation, 51
ADVOC., Aug. 2008, at 18, 19 (“[T]he bar of innovation is rising for would-be patentees and
patent holders. Overcoming rejections and withstanding invalidity attacks based on
obviousness is now, and will likely remain for the foreseeable future, a more challenging issue
than it has been in the past.”); Jennifer Nock & Sreekar Gadde, Raising the Bar for
Nonobviousness: An Empirical Study of Federal Circuit Case Law Following KSR, 20 FED.
CIR. B.J. 369, 370-71 (2011) (documenting remarkable shift in Federal Circuit’s ruling on
obviousness after KSR).
188
Jason Rantanen, The Federal Circuit’s New Obviousness Jurisprudence: An Empricial
Study, 16 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 709, 711, 764 (2013) (confirming prediction that “inventions
that were nonobvious the day before KSR would suddenly become obvious” with empirical
study of Federal Circuit cases after KSR); David Tseng, Not All Patents Are Created Equal:
Bias Against Predictable Arts Patents in the Post-KSR Landscape, 13 CHI.-KENT J. INTELL.
PROP. 165, 165 (2013).
189
KSR Int’l, 550 U.S. at 427 (“[T]he results of ordinary innovation are not the subject of
exclusive rights under the patent laws.”); see also Mandel, supra note 10, at 120 (noting that
current obviousness standard is mandated by KSR to separate “ordinary innovation” from
“real innovation”).
190
R. Keith Sawyer, Creativity, Innovation, and Obviousness, 12 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV.
461, 463 (2008) (“Losers, many of whom filed amicus briefs for the respondent, included
those who depend on IP protection for income: independent inventors, universities with their
technology transfer operations, and small startup businesses, who often depend on proprietary
technology to interest venture capital investors.”). Ordinary innovations are the reality of
improvements. See Motion for Leave to File Brief & Brief of Amicus Curiae American
Intellectual Property Law Ass’n as Amicus Curiae Supporting Petitioners at 2, Ill. Tool Works
Inc. v. Indep. Ink, Inc., 547 U.S. 28 (2006) (No. 04-1329), 2005 WL 1334162, at *2
(“[V]irtually all patents cover improvements to existing products that represent modest
incremental advances.”).
191
Robert Sterne, founder of Sterne, Kessler, Goldstein & Fox, expressed his concerns as
a panelist at The Current Patent Landscape in the U.S. and Abroad: “[T]he positive impact
of the U.S. patent system on universities, start-ups, and individual inventors has rapidly
declined and no longer, in many respects, provides the engine for funding of this very critical
innovation that is done by small and medium-sized companies and universities.” Sterne, supra
note 9, at 5.
192
See, e.g., id.
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investment in new drugs and new technologies.193 Moreover, the jobs relating to
invention in the life sciences and many other areas are moving offshore,194 as
investors turn their attention to different sectors195 or to different jurisdictions
that are more willing to extend patent protection for similar inventions. 196
For example, China is more willing to protect software patents and includes
software inventions in the scope of the patent protection and innovation

193
See Paul A. Stone, Gen. Counsel and Chief Operating Officer, 5AM Ventures, Remarks
at 12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute: The Current Patent Landscape in the U.S. and
Abroad 9 (Mar. 9-10, 2017) (transcript available at https://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wp-content
/uploads/sites/31/2017/04/The-Current-Patent-Landscape-in-the-U.S.-and-Abroad-FINALTRANSCRIPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P8K-UBQF]) (“If we have a strong patent system like
we’ve had historically in the U.S., we will continue to see meaningful investment in new
technologies. Contrarily, if we have a weaker patent system, you will see less investment in
new technologies.”); see also Paul Evans, Vice President of Intellectual Prop., Vivint, Inc.,
Remarks at 12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute: The Current Patent Landscape in the
U.S. and Abroad 21-23 (Mar. 9-10, 2017) (transcript available at https://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wpcontent/uploads/sites/31/2017/04/The-Current-Patent-Landscape-in-the-U.S.-and-AbroadFINAL-TRANSCRIPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P8K-UBQF]) (providing firsthand account on
diminishing investment in small companies due to weak and uncertain patent system).
194
Stone, supra note 193, at 9.
195
Judge Michel remarked:
America spent decades off-shoring the vast portion of manufacturing. My concern is we
may be moving in the direction of off-shoring invention in a similar fashion. And that
would be critically harmful to the country. The Kauffmann Foundation and the Census
Bureau, in multiple studies, have documented that most net new jobs come from small
start-up companies dependent on technology. So if we’re going to create jobs, if we’re
going to create prosperity, the patent system has to adequately incentivize the investment
managers and I think it’s failing to do that. . . . [T]here’s, I think, a serious danger that
the weakened patent system will turn around the investment engine and if we don’t watch
it, the patent system will reach the point of collapse.
Paul R. Michel, Chief Judge, Retired, U.S. Court of Appeals for the Fed. Circuit, Remarks at
12th Annual Advanced Patent Law Institute: The Current Patent Landscape in the U.S. and
Abroad 7-8 (Mar. 9-10, 2017) (transcript available at https://sls.gmu.edu/cpip/wpcontent/uploads/sites/31/2017/04/The-Current-Patent-Landscape-in-the-U.S.-and-AbroadFINAL-TRANSCRIPT.pdf [https://perma.cc/3P8K-UBQF]). Paul Evans stated that
investments that occurred in prior years under strong patent protection are not happening
today because under the current weak patent system investors assigned “zero value to patents”
due to the high risks. Evans, supra note 193, at 22.
196
Robert Sterne further observed:
The EPO and the European Union have risen in importance as a place to protect and
enforce global patent rights—a dramatic change. The Chinese patent system has
mimicked the growth and importance of the Chinese economy, with filings of Chinese
applications at SIPO exceeding filings at the USPTO and Chinese-originated
applications being the fastest growing country group at the USPTO and the EPO.
Sterne, supra note 9, at 4.
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ecosystem.197 Under China’s strong patent system, injunctive relief is readily
available as 90% of patentees secure relief upon a finding of infringement.198
Plaintiffs, in enforcing their patents against infringers, enjoy a success rate of
more than 60%.199 In other words, China provides a strong and favorable patent
system.200 Consequently, investments in creating and valuing intellectual
property have been diverted to or concentrated in Europe and China.201
The Supreme Court is not alone in the attack on innovation. The PTAB, which
was created amid the narrative of patent troll hysteria, has also played a
significant role.202 Since its inception in 2012, the PTAB has presided over 6,000
proceedings brought to challenge many valuable patents.203 The PTAB has
invalidated almost two-thirds of the patents disputed, and patent owners face
seriously low percentages of success for the patents that have just gone through
the examinations conducted by the Patent Office.204 Peculiarly, the guidelines
that the Patent Office examiners have applied in examining the patent
applications and granting the patents are the same guidelines that the PTAB
judges use to immediately invalidate the just-granted patents.205 In other words,
under the current patent system, the presumption of validity seems to no longer
exist! The high rate of invalidating patents, one commentator has noted, makes
it seem as though the examination has never occurred.206 That means patent

197

See Stone, supra note 193, at 13-14 (“[A]s of April 1st, [2017,] Article 25 of the
Chinese Patent Law will actually introduce things like software patents and business method
patents. So they’ll be getting beyond means plus function. Business models to the extent that
they’re attendant to a technical feature or some sort of implementation dependency—they will
now actually be in scope. . . . [T]he Chinese have learned how powerful intellectual property
is. They’ve wrapped it up as an integral part of their innovation ecosystem.”).
198
Matteo, supra note 7, at 14 (“In China, it’s upwards of 90 percent of the time that there’s
a finding of infringement.”).
199
Id. (“[I]n China, if you litigate a patent, typically as a plaintiff, you will prevail 60
percent of the time—70 percent of the time if you’re a foreign plaintiff against a domestic
defendant.”).
200
See id.
201
Id. at 12 (“I’ve seen a lot more interest in Europe and in China as places to put
intellectual property or value intellectual property, create intellectual property, than certainly
in the United States.”); see also Detkin, supra note 7, at 18-19 (noting that due to recent court
rulings and patent legislation that brought an “unhealthy amount of uncertainty to the
market[,] . . . investment in the United States is way down and going up—in Europe”).
202
35 U.S.C. § 6(a) (2012); see Sterne, supra note 9, at 41 (“There’s a lot of
misinformation about the patent system these days that is spread using the patent troll
narrative. What is being said might have been correct 10 years ago, but it’s not correct
today.”).
203
Sterne, supra note 9, at 5.
204
Id.
205
Id. at 43.
206
See id.
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owners face uncertainty in trying to get patent protection and lack the incentive
to innovate in the United States.
In summary, although the winners of a weakened patent system continue to
spread their patent troll hysteria and misinformation today, they cannot ignore
the reality that innovation and investment have increasingly shifted to strong
patent jurisdictions.207 The attack on innovation, vis-à-vis the systematic
weakening of the patent system, is real, with serious consequences for
investment, job creation, and national security. 208
B.

Decline in Basic and Late-Stage Research and Development Funding

The decline in government R&D funding has been occurring for quite some
time.209 The uncertainty of funding became a reality throughout the last two
decades.210 According to the American Association for the Advancement of
Science (“AAAS”), federal funding fell from $160 billion in 2010 to $140
billion in 2013, marking the largest decrease in a three-year period since the
space race.211 Federal spending on R&D accounted for more than 2% of the GDP
in the 1970s, but in 2014 the spending plunged to 0.78% of the GDP.212
With respect to basic scientific research funding, beginning in 2013, the U.S.
government decided that it would no longer fund a majority of the basic research
conducted across the nation.213 In the 1960s and 1970s, the federal government
shouldered 70% of the funding for basic research.214 This amount was cut back
to 61% as of 2004, and then again to below 50% in 2013.215 In 2015, the
207
Promoting Innovation, Investment and Job Growth by Fixing America’s Patent System,
INT’L IP COMMERCIALIZATION COUNCIL, http://wwwiipcc.appspot.com/make-patents-greatagain.html [https://perma.cc/SSH3-5KC8] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019) (“A decline in the
reliability of patents is contributing to a waning of entrepreneurial energy and a decline in the
risk tolerance of American investors and entrepreneurs. As a result, investment capital is
moving increasingly to products and services with shorter time horizons and lower risk. This
shift has profound implications for the long-term U.S. economy, as China, Korea, Germany
and other countries expand the role that patents play in their economies with ambitious plans
to displace American dominance of technology in the years to come.”).
208
See Sterne, supra note 9, at 41-42 (discussing how investment will dry up jobs and how
loss of jobs becomes national security issue).
209
Michael Hiltzik, Does Congress Deserve a Raise?, L.A. TIMES, Oct. 16, 2013, at B1
(documenting Superconducting Super Collider (“SSC”) project, which began in 1980 and was
cancelled by Congress in 1993, to demonstrate U.S. shortsightedness in not funding basic
science research).
210
See, e.g., Sterne, supra note 9, at 8, 40-42.
211
Jahne, supra note 14.
212
Id.
213
Mervis, supra note 90 (“[T]he federal government no longer funds a majority of the
basic research carried out in the United States.”).
214
Id.
215
Id.
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government provided only 44% of the total amount spent on basic research, or
$38 billion.216 Again in 2017, the number dropped to $34.9 billion.217 The reality
is painfully clear; without government funding, basic scientific research would
stop, as industry would not focus on fundamental discoveries.218 Nearly half of
the 11,000 scientists in a study conducted by MIT revealed that they had to
abandon projects central to their labs due to economic pressure.219 The antiscience narrative echoed in the halls of Congress shows that basic science is
often misunderstood and ridiculed in order to justify the reduction in funding.220
Not only is the government shrinking funding for basic research, but corporate
funding on fundamental scientific research is also in decline, as studies show
that large firms are investing less in research, the stock market value of research
is declining, and established firms today “can no longer emulate firms such as
DuPont, AT&T, IBM, or Merck.”221As of today, basic research is conducted at
universities,222 but the government has also cut back on grants for such
research.223
Another troublesome area of U.S. funding patterns is the decline in funding,
or lack of funding altogether, for late-stage research.224 There are three forms of
R&D: basic, applied, and development. In basic research, the goal is to expand
on fundamental knowledge.225 In applied research, the purpose is to use

216

Id.
Sci. News Staff, How Science Fares in the U.S. Budget Deal, SCI. MAG. (May 1, 2017,
11:15 AM), http://www.sciencemag.org/news/2017/05/how-science-fares-us-budget-deal
[https://perma.cc/J9EC-27VD].
218
See Myhrvold, supra note 16, at 11 (“Without government support, most basic
scientific research will never happen.”); Jahne, supra note 14 (discussing how cuts in federal
research threaten scientific progress).
219
Hiltzik, supra note 88 (reporting that nearly half of 11,000 respondents in Chronicle of
Higher Education survey reported that they “had been forced by economic pressures to
abandon an area of investigation they thought ‘central to their lab’s mission’”).
220
See MIT COMM. TO EVALUATE THE INNOVATION DEFICIT, supra note 3, at vi (“Basic
research is often misunderstood, because it often seems to have no immediate payoff.”).
221
Arora, supra note 93.
222
Beryl Lieff Benderly, The Downs and Ups of Corporate Research, SCI. MAG. (May 3,
2017, 2:30 PM), http://www.sciencemag.org/careers/2017/05/downs-and-ups-corporateresearch [https://perma.cc/5Y88-RZ5Q] (“These days, the basic research that fuels
breakthrough science and supports important technological innovation mostly happens at
universities.”).
223
See id.
224
Sirkin, Rose & Choraria, supra note 95 (discussing United States’ decline in research
spending).
225
See NAT’L SCI. BOARD, SCIENCE AND ENGINEERING INDICATORS 2018, at 105 (2018)
(stating that basic research is “[e]xperimental or theoretical work undertaken primarily to
acquire new knowledge of the underlying foundations of phenomena and observable facts,
without any particular application or use in view”).
217
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scientific knowledge to solve practical problems and to devise solutions to
improve the human condition, diseases, environment, and the like.226 In
development research, the goal is systematic use of knowledge in production to
develop useful materials, devices, systems, or methods. 227 The United States
does not devote significant funding in development research to yielding
commercial products.228 China is taking the opposite approach and is projected
to invest twice as much as the United States in development research.229 In fact,
China is taking the knowledge developed by the United States in the early stage
of R&D and then spending significantly on the development research to turn it
into new commercial products.230
Traditionally, the U.S. government bears the bulk of the cost of the earlystage R&D, and industry incurs the cost of the development research. 231 This
division is due to the line that is drawn between academia and private industry. 232
Further, collaboration between and among firms in private industry for
development research is rare, leaving public-private research consortia to
engage, if at all, in development research.233 Consequently, there is much
friction to innovation, hindering the systematic transformation of the knowledge
to late-stage R&D for innovative products.234 That means that the United States
has not been able to translate “technological breakthroughs” into advanced
manufacturing domestically.235 Flat panel displays, lithium ion batteries, digital
226

See id. at 44 (stating that applied research is “[o]riginal investigation undertaken in
order to acquire new knowledge; directed primarily, however, toward a specific, practical aim
or objective”).
227
See id. (stating that experimental development research is “[s]ystematic work, drawing
on knowledge gained from research and practical experience and producing additional
knowledge, which is directed to producing new products or processes or to improving existing
products or processes”).
228
Sirkin, Rose & Choraria, supra note 95.
229
Id. (“In another five years, China will be investing up to twice as much as the US on
development research . . . .”).
230
Paul Davidson, Why China Is Beating the U.S. at Innovation, USA TODAY (Apr. 17,
2017, 3:32 PM), https://www.usatoday.com/story/money/2017/04/17/why-china-beating-usinnovation/100016138/ (stating that U.S. has been “doing the hard work of inventing new
technologies, and China, among other countries, is reaping the benefits by taking those ideas
and turning them into commercial products”).
231
See Sirkin, Rose & Choraria, supra note 95 (“The US remains dominant at the front
end of R&D . . . .”).
232
See id. (“One source of friction occurs between academia and private industry. The
lion’s share of basic and applied research is funded by the federal government and conducted
at universities, while industry focuses overwhelmingly on development research.”).
233
See id. (“Friction among companies, meanwhile, slows innovation on advanced
manufacturing processes.”).
234
See id. (proposing ways to address problem in U.S. in late-stage R&D funding area).
235
Id.
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mobile handsets, notebook computers, and photovoltaic cells are all examples
of products based on innovations invented in the United States but manufactured
offshore because the United States has been ignoring late-stage development to
commercialize and yield new products.236
Meanwhile, China has spent more on development research than the United
States has, and is projected to continue to spend more to ensure that China is the
country that innovates and brings products to the marketplace.237 Currently,
China’s development research accounts for 84% of its total R&D spending.238
In the past decade, China’s spending on development research grew 20% per
year compared to 5% in the United States.239
Overall, the decline in federal government funding for basic research,
industries’ lack of a long-term view of R&D, and the missing late-stage
development focus by industries are plunging the United States to a period of
innovation crisis.240 The crisis will have serious implications for the United
States’ economic competitiveness, national security, and national global
standing.241
C.

Weakening Tax System Governing Innovation

The U.S. tax system governing innovation has recently been transformed by
new legislation. On December 20, 2017, Congress passed the Tax Cuts and Jobs
Act (“TCJA”)242 with a 51-48 vote in the Senate and a 224-201 vote in the
House. The TCJA represents one of the most significant overhauls of the Code
in more than three decades. The act made numerous changes to the income tax
as it applies to individuals and business.243 The leading theme of the new law is
an across-the-board reduction of rates.244 Proponents of the TCJA argue that rate

236

Id.
Id.
238
Id.
239
Id.
240
MIT COMM. TO EVALUATE THE INNOVATION DEFICIT, supra note 3, at vii (concluding
strategic areas of basic research—like supercomputing, cybersecurity, quantum computing,
and photonics—that U.S. has allowed to fall behind “ought to be alarming”). Moreover, the
decline in government funding can “disrupt research efforts and cause long term damage,
especially to the pipeline of scientific talent on which U.S. research leadership ultimately
depends.” Id. at ix.
241
Hiltzik, supra note 88 (discussing decline in U.S. academia); Sirkin, Rose & Choraria,
supra note 95 (discussing holistically the impact of current U.S. government research).
242
Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054. The TCJA’s official
purpose was “to provide for reconciliation pursuant to titles II and V of the concurrent
resolution on the budget for fiscal year 2018.” Id. President Trump signed the bill into law on
December 22, 2017. See id. It is effective for tax years beginning in 2018. See id.
243
Id.
244
Id.
237
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reductions will ultimately stimulate the economy in ways that are beneficial to
workers as well as businesses.245
In addition to lowering tax rates, the TCJA expanded tax incentives for
investments in tangible property, such as manufacturing equipment and
machinery, as businesses are now permitted to fully expense 100% of their
purchases of tangible, personal depreciable property.246 Expanding the expense
allowance for acquisition of equipment, machinery, and other tangible property
represents a significant tax subsidy for tangible capital investments. 247
Nevertheless, it was viewed as important to incentivize and increase business
spending on tangible assets; in theory, it would lower the cost of tangible capital
used in an active trade or business, in turn stimulating business investment and
the economy.248 Policymakers had these goals in mind when they enacted special
expensing for tangible property.249 House Ways and Means Committee
Chairman Kevin Brady (R-Texas) noted that full and immediate expensing of
tangible assets is the best way to expand the economy. 250
In providing tax rate cuts and enhanced tax breaks for tangible capital
investment, the TCJA had to amend or repeal a number of provisions to help
245

See, e.g., Steven T. Mnuchin, The Tax Cuts and Jobs Act Is Working, WHITEHOUSE.GOV
(Apr. 15, 2019), https://www.whitehouse.gov/articles/tax-cuts-jobs-act-working/ [https:
//perma.cc/FN9M-H486].
246
Id. The TCJA increased the maximum amount a taxpayer may expense under section
179 to $1,000,000, as well as expanded the types of tangible property eligible for expensing.
Id. § 13101, 131 Stat. at 2101 (substituting $1,000,000 for $500,000 in regard to rules for
expensing depreciable assets). More importantly, the TCJA extended and modified additional
first-year depreciation of tangible assets under section 168(k) through 2026. Id. § 13201, 131
Stat. at 2105. The former 50% allowance was increased to 100% for property placed in service
after September 27, 2017, and before January 1, 2023. Id.
247
Kyle Pomerleau & Scott Greenberg, Full Expensing Costs Less Than You’d Think, TAX
FOUND. (June 13, 2017), https://taxfoundation.org/full-expensing-costs-less-than-youd-think/
[https://perma.cc/N9F4-BK54] (discussing TJCA’s impact on tangible capital investments).
On a static basis, expensing of tangible property would cost $2.2 trillion over a decade. Id.
(“For instance, last June, the Tax Foundation estimated that moving to full expensing would
reduce federal revenue by $2.2 trillion over ten years, on a static basis.”). But after accounting
for economic growth, that number would be reduced to $883 billion over ten years. Id.
248
See Tax Cut and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No. 115-97, 131 Stat. 2054 (“Full expensing
of capital investments is probably the single most significant tax change lawmakers could
make to encourage economic growth.”).
249
See GARY GUENTHER, CONG. RESEARCH SERV., RL31852, SMALL BUSINESS EXPENSING
ALLOWANCE: CURRENT STATUS, LEGISLATIVE PROPOSALS, AND ECONOMIC EFFECTS 3-5 (2009)
(weighing costs and benefits of expensing for small businesses).
250
See Laura Davison, Full Expensing: The Next Tax Reform Battle, BNA (June 21, 2017),
https://www.bna.com/full-expensing-next-n73014453642/ [https://perma.cc/HS5P-JSQY];
Jacob Puhl, Brady Doubles Down on 100 Percent Expensing at Ways and Means Hearing,
DELOITTE (May 19, 2017), http://newsletters.usdbriefs.com/2017/Tax/TNV/170519_1.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TNH5-CBSP].
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make up tax revenue loss. Unfortunately, two provisions targeted long-standing
tax incentives for innovation capital. Specifically, the TCJA eliminated two tax
incentives for innovation that have existed in our tax system for over half a
century: (1) the current tax deduction for innovation and (2) preferential capital
gains rate treatment applicable to dispositions of successful inventions. The
TCJA is also notable for what it did not do. Specifically, the TCJA did not, as
some had predicted, enhance the research credit, which many viewed as
necessary to maximize its effectiveness. In addition, the TCJA did not adopt a
U.S. patent box, which many countries have done in recent years to attract
valuable innovation activity to their borders. These developments will
undoubtedly have a negative impact on American innovation.
A close examination of the TCJA reveals that Congress was more concerned
about capturing tax revenue from intellectual property income rather than
spurring American innovation. Indeed, some of the more complicated provisions
of the TCJA are international tax rules designed to tax foreign income
attributable to research conducted here in the United States. Ironically, all of
these efforts, including the base erosion measures, may have the effect of
moving the United States in the direction of “off-shore invention.” Off-shore
invention would reflect the worst-case scenario; the United States would lose
valuable innovation activity and its positive spillover effects, as well as the
income from such activity and tax revenues.
Each of these recent tax policy choices is worthy of consideration.
1.

Elimination of 100% Expensing of Innovation Costs

Since 1954, the government has permitted 100% expensing for spending on
qualified research, including amounts paid in connection with the development
of any computer software.251 Under the TCJA, this long-standing rule is
eliminated after 2021.252 Instead, amounts paid or incurred for specified research
or experimental expenditures after 2021 (including software development costs)
generally must be capitalized and amortized ratably over five years. 253
Overnight, the government changed the law from permitting a 100% write-off
in the year in which innovation costs were paid or incurred to requiring costs to

251
See supra notes 116-32 and accompanying text (discussing government expenditures
on research).
252
See I.R.C. § 174(a) (2012) (as amended by Tax Cuts and Jobs Act of 2017, Pub. L. No.
115-97, 131 Stat. 2054, and as applied to amounts paid or incurred in tax years beginning
after December 31, 2021). Similarly, the rule that taxpayers may elect an amortization period
of sixty months or greater, beginning when benefits are first realized, is eliminated after 2021.
See id.
253
Id. Amounts attributable to foreign research must be amortized ratably over fifteen
years instead of five years. Id. § 174(a)(2). For this purpose, foreign research means any
research conducted outside the United States, Puerto Rico, or any United States territory. Id.
(indicating that section 174(d)(4)(F)’s definition of foreign research applies).
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be spread out over a five-year period.254 Unfortunately, there is nothing in the
legislative history explaining why the government eliminated 100% expensing,
which has been a feature of our tax system for some time. 255
There is nothing in the legislative history to explain why the government
chose a write-off period of five years.256 Will a five-year write-off adequately
incentivize desirable innovation activity? Does grouping all innovations in a
five-year write-off category measure income with sufficient accuracy (i.e., is
there some correlation between five years and the actual economic useful lives
of inventions)? What are the anticipated compliance and administrative costs
under a five-year rule?257 Unfortunately, the five-year period was chosen
without consideration of these questions.258 Most likely, five years was chosen
because it is the period the government has historically used as the “baseline” to
measure the tax expenditure cost of immediate expensing of research and
experimentation.259
If the government was intent on requiring the capitalization and amortization
of innovation costs, a shorter write-off period should have been considered.
Compared to other investments, innovation is risky, and therefore, innovation
risks, such as retirement risk and revenue risk, should be relevant in the design
of an ideal cost-recovery rule.260 As some economists have argued, cost recovery
“schedules for relatively risky assets should be accelerated to compensate the

254

See id. § 174(a)(1)-(2).
See Calvin H. Johnson, Capitalize Costs of Software Development, 124 TAX NOTES
603, 612 (2009) (discussing other reasons for elimination of 100% expensing). Some have
argued that expensing represents bad tax policy. Professor Calvin Johnson, for instance, has
argued that expensing of software development costs provides too much subsidy for
investments that have no special merit and give no external value to the public; for example,
expensing encourages a waste of capital because the investments would not be made in the
absence of the tax breaks and should not be made because the real pretax demand does not
justify the real pretax costs. Id.
256
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 115-97 (2017).
257
Businesses spend over 448 million hours annually complying with depreciation and
amortization regimes. Office of Info. & Regulatory Affairs, View ICR—OIRA Conclusion,
REGINFO.GOV, https://www.reginfo.gov/public/do/PRAViewICR?ref_nbr=201312-1545-029
[https://perma.cc/X92Q-VKEP] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
258
See generally H.R. REP. NO. 115-97.
259
See Tax Expenditures 2019, supra note 100, at 4 (“The baseline assumed for the normal
tax method is that all R&E expenditures are successful and have an expected life of five
years.”). A normal income tax could require taxpayers to capitalize and write off the costs
associated with investments over time to better match the streams of income and associated
costs. Expensing is thus viewed as a tax expenditure. The “baseline” assumed for the normal
tax is that all research is successful and has an expected life of five years. Id.
260
See Jeff Strnad, Tax Depreciation and Risk, 52 SMU L. REV. 547, 548 (1999)
(“[R]etirement risk must be taken into account in designing an accelerated schedule that does
not favor some assets over others”).
255
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owners of such assets for bearing a disproportionably large share of the capital
price risk.”261 It is often difficult to determine whether innovation will produce
benefits and, if so, how long those benefits will last. For example, an inventor
cannot be certain about whether all of his or her patent applications will mature
to patents. In addition, even if a patent is obtained, there is always a fear that the
patents may be subsequently invalidated by a third party. These concerns were
likely behind the government’s 1993 creation of a three-year write-off period (as
opposed to five-year write-off period) for computer software acquisitions. 262
One might accept that a longer recovery period, such as the five-year period
under the new law, is justified as long as there are ex post adjustments (tax
deductions for unamortized costs) available to inventors upon later sale or
retirement of their inventions; however, the new tax law does not permit such
tax loss deductions on either the sale or the retirement of innovations.263 Under
the new law, an inventor must continue to amortize research costs over five years
even if the property with respect to which the costs were paid or incurred is
disposed of or abandoned during the five-year amortization period.264 In other
words, no current deduction of the unamortized portion of the expenditure is
allowed.265 This approach—ex ante slow cost recovery schedule of five years
without any ex post adjustments—combines the worst of both worlds.266
No doubt the elimination of 100% expensing will impact a large number of
taxpayers. As noted earlier, the government anticipates saving $119 billion over
the next ten years as a result of the elimination (8% of the projected $1.5 trillion
cost of the entire tax legislation).267 That figure reflects the magnitude of
projected research spending that will be ineligible for the tax incentive beginning
in 2022.268 The change, once effective, will have the effect of increasing the cost
of private research by these firms. The change may induce firms to make
261

Ethan Yale, When Are Capitalization Exceptions Justified?, 57 TAX L. REV. 549, 572
(2004).
262
See I.R.C. § 167(f) (2012) (noting three-year period for computer software acquisition
costs).
263
Id. § 174(d) (noting that there are no ex post adjustments on sale or retirement of
innovations). Under prior law, the deductible amount on sale was the excess of the adjusted
basis in the innovation over the amount realized in the trade. Id. § 1001. The deductible
amount on retirement or obsolescence was the unrecovered adjusted basis in the innovation.
Id. § 165.
264
Id. § 174(d) (indicating treatment upon disposition, retirement, or abandonment of
innovations).
265
See id.
266
As noted by one commentator, an “accelerated depreciation system . . . reduces
strategic loss-taking. Under an accelerated schedule adjusted basis is lower at any given point
in time. It is less likely that adjusted basis will ever exceed market value by enough to make
strategic loss-taking profitable net of trading costs.” Strnad, supra note 260, at 597.
267
See supra note 159 and accompanying text.
268
Id.
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distorted and inefficient business decisions. Firms likely to invest in innovation
may be more inclined to invest in tangible equipment instead; for example, we
may see a shift in investments from intangible capital to tangible capital. Perhaps
this was the desire all along, especially in light of the fact that Congress just
enhanced the tax write-offs for equipment and machine—a trade-off of sorts
with increased tax breaks for equipment paid for by the elimination of the R&D
deduction. Interestingly, the projected revenue losses from the increased
deductions for equipment total $112 billion over the next ten years, which is
very close to the projected revenue gain from elimination of the R&D
deduction.269
One might argue that elimination of expensing is of little significance since
the research tax credit is still available for these firms, as Congress did leave
intact the section 41 research credit as a front-end tax incentive for innovation. 270
The problem is that the research tax credit is not available for many individual
and corporate innovators that previously benefited from the deduction.271 The
credit’s reformulation over the years has limited the types of research for which
it is available.272 Not all expenditures that qualify for the research deduction
under section 174 qualify for the research credit under section 41 due to special
regulatory requirements and exceptions.273 In addition, the incremental nature of
the credit prevents many individual and small business innovators who
heretofore utilized the deduction from using the credit. 274 As currently
formulated, the credit is not available if a taxpayer’s gross sales have grown
faster than the taxpayer’s qualified research expenditures; this might explain
why many start-ups do not benefit from the credit and why only the largest
businesses do.275 According to the Joint Committee on Taxation, firms with
assets of $1 million or more account for over 77% of all corporations claiming
a credit and represent more than 98% of the credits claimed.276 Firms with assets
269
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 115TH CONG., supra note 155, at 17 (indicating projected
revenue losses).
270
See I.R.C. § 41 (2012).
271
See id.
272
See id.
273
See id.
274
Taxpayers may, at their election, compute the research credit under another
alternative—the alternative simplified credit method—in lieu of the regular credit. The
alternative simplified credit is an amount equal to 14% of the amount by which the qualified
research expenses exceed 50% of the average qualified research expenses for the three
preceding tax years. Id. § 41(c)(5) (indicating option for election of alternative simplified
credit).
275
See JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., JCX45-11, TAX INCENTIVES FOR
RESEARCH, EXPERIMENTATION, AND INNOVATION 11 (2011) (noting that firms with assets of
$50 million or more account for 18% of all corporations claiming credit but represent more
than 85% of credits claimed).
276
See id. at 13.
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under $100,000 represent only 1.2% of the credits claimed. 277 The largest sector
claiming research credits is manufacturing (69% of credits).278 Historically,
individual and small business innovators and start-ups, as well as those not
engaged in big manufacturing, have not been the primary beneficiaries, and it
does not seem likely they will suddenly qualify because the only other front-end
incentive (the tax deduction) has been eliminated.279 The delayed effective date
(the requirement that all specified research expenditures must be amortized
starting in 2022) may signal that the law change is more about meeting the
revenue goals of the TCJA rather than a permanent move from expensing to
amortization of innovation costs. Regardless of whether Congress intended this
to become permanent legislation, there are no guarantees for reversal in the near
future. Unfortunately, this uncertainty will only further reduce innovative
activity, as a recent report of the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and
Development (“OECD”) and International Monetary Fund (“IMF”) identified
frequent tax changes as the greatest factor in business uncertainty affecting
investment and growth.280
2.

Elimination of Capital Gain Treatment for Innovation Dispositions

In addition to eliminating an important front-end incentive for innovation
(starting in 2022), the TCJA eliminated an important back-end incentive by
changing the capital gains rules for innovation dispositions (starting in 2018). 281
Gains realized from dispositions of property are taxed at lower capital gains rates
if such gains are characterized as capital gains.282 One such requirement is that
the property disposed of be a so-called “capital asset.” 283 In 2017, the TCJA
excluded from the capital asset definition self-created patents, inventions,
designs, and secret formulas; instead, under the act, a patent, invention, model
or design (patented or not), or secret formula or process is not a capital asset in

277

See id.
See id. at 12.
279
See I.R.C. § 41(h) (2012) (noting that, in recognition of fact that some start-up
companies and small business were not benefiting from credit, Congress expanded credit in
2015 so that those entities could use it to offset payroll taxes or alternative minimum tax).
280
See INT’L MONETARY FUND & ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., TAX
CERTAINTY: IMF/OECD REPORT FOR THE G20 FINANCE MINISTERS 11 (2017),
https://www.oecd.org/tax/tax-policy/tax-certainty-report-oecd-imf-report-g20-financeministers-march-2017.pdf [https://perma.cc/E7ZE-STST] (discussing nature and impact of
tax uncertainty).
281
See I.R.C. § 1221(a)(3) (2012).
282
See id. § 1221 (indicating preferential treatment for capital gains). A long term capital
gain is defined as a gain from the sale or exchange of a capital asset held for more than one
year. Id.
283
Id.
278
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the hands of the taxpayer whose personal efforts created the property. 284 Thus,
under general characterization principles, gains from the sale of a patent,
invention, model or design, or secret formula that is held by the creator will no
longer be eligible for preferential capital gains treatment.285
The legislative history behind the TCJA of 2017 explains why self-created
patents and similar property were targeted for ordinary tax rate treatment: “Since
the intent of Congress is that profits and losses arising from everyday business
operations be characterized as ordinary income and loss, the general definition
of capital asset is narrowly applied and the categories of exclusions are broadly
interpreted.”286 The legislative history behind the original 1950 provision (which
excluded only self-created copyrights and similar property) similarly noted that
gains from personal efforts (income from a book or other artistic work) should
be treated as ordinary income regardless of whether the taxpayer was in the
profession of writing books or creating other artistic works or was an amateur.
However, the legislative history behind the 1950 law made it very clear why
self-created patents and similar property were not targeted for ordinary income
treatment: “[T]he desirability of fostering the work of such inventors outweighs
the small amount of additional revenue which might be obtained” by including
inventions, patents, and designs.287
The revenue impact of removing self-created patents and inventions from
capital asset characterization is expected to be minimal. 288 This might be due to
the fact that much innovation comes from corporations (whose employees
invent), and the tax law change does not impact works for hire. This might also
be due to the fact that Congress failed to repeal section 1235 for patents created
by individuals. Regardless, treating as ordinary income the gains from the sale
of an invention or patent by the amateur or occasional inventor is a complete
shift in innovation tax policy—and runs counter to America’s desire to foster the
work of such individuals.
It is worthy to note that Congress failed to repeal section 1235. Recall from
Part I that section 1235 was enacted in 1954 as a tax incentive for innovation.289
It acts like a safe-harbor for certain patent dispositions by individuals. When it
applies, it provides statutory assurance to certain inventors that the sale of their

284
See id. § 1221(a)(3) (noting that exception also applies to taxpayer with substitute or
transferred basis from taxpayer whose personal efforts created property).
285
Id. These types of self-created property also do not qualify for special treatment of the
quasi-capital asset rules of section 1231. Id. § 1231(b)(1)(C).
286
H.R. REP. NO. 115-466, at 414 (2017) (Conf. Rep.).
287
S. REP. NO. 81-2375, at 44 (1950), as reprinted in 1950 U.S.C.C.A.N. 3053, 3098; see
supra Section I.C.1 (discussing history of special rate treatment for innovation gains).
288
JOINT COMM. ON TAXATION, 112TH CONG., supra note 275, at 5 (estimating that impact
on revenue of removing self-created patents and inventions from capital asset characterization
is about half billion dollars over ten years).
289
See supra Section I.C.1.
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inventions will qualify for reduced capital gains rates as opposed to ordinary
income tax rates, even if the sale involves contingent payments, the transferor is
a professional inventor, and the invention has been held for less than one year.290
The House bill proposed repealing section 1235, which would have completely
eliminated any chance innovation gains would be taxed at the lower capital gain
rate.291 The Senate version, however, kept it, and the Conference Committee
agreed with the Senate.292
It would be a mistake, however, to conclude that the special characterization
rule of section 1235 saved the day. While it does remain on the books as the only
back-end tax incentive for innovation, it is of limited application. For example,
section 1235 applies only to a “patent,” a term defined in the regulations.293 In
addition, section 1235 applies only if there is a transfer of “all substantial rights”
to a patent, which does not include transfers that are limited geographically
within the country of issuance or transfers that are limited to fields of use within
trades or industries.294 Finally, section 1235’s favorable capital gains treatment
applies only if the transferor is a statutorily defined “holder” of the patent,
defined as any individual whose personal efforts created the patent property and
who would qualify as the “original and first” inventor under the patent laws;295
therefore, section 1235 is unavailable to the more common startup companies
and small research entities whose employees conduct their research.296
Given the TCJA’s changes to long-standing general characterization
principles and the limited application of section 1235, the tax law governing
patents has moved closer to the tax law governing other forms of intellectual
property such as copyrights and trademarks. While there may be efficiency
arguments for treating all forms of intellectual property the same for tax
purposes, there are strong arguments for treating patents differently. For
example, unlike copyrights and many artworks, the creation of patentable
property may entail a capital investment. Indeed, in industries like medical
devices, pharma, biotechnology, and genetic engineering, intensive capital
290

See supra notes 112-17 and accompanying text.
An Act to Provide for Reconciliation Pursuant to Titles II and V of the Concurrent
Resolution on the Budget for Fiscal Year 2018, H.R. 1, 115th Cong. § 3312 (2017).
292
S. Res. 1, 115th Cong. (2017) (indicating Senate’s stance on certain self-created
property not treated as capital asset).
293
Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(a) (as amended in 1980) (defining patent).
294
Id. § 1.1235-2(b)(1) (defining all substantial rights to patent).
295
I.R.C. § 1235(b)(1) (2012) (defining holder as “any individual whose efforts created
such property”); Treas. Reg. § 1.1235-2(d)(1)(i) (as amended in 1980) (defining holder).
296
This is irrelevant for tax rate purposes, as corporate income (both ordinary income and
capital gain income) is taxed at the same rate. I.R.C. § 11 (2012). Nevertheless, capital gain
treatment is often sought by companies because their capital losses are deductible in any given
year only to the extent they have capital gains. Id. § 1211. In other words, to the extent income
is characterized as capital gain income, that income can be used to absorb any capital losses
the company might have.
291
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investment is necessary in order to obtain the right technology suitable for
scalability and market competition. Furthermore, patents contribute significantly
to the strength or welfare of the nation in a very tangible way. This is illustrated
by how new sectors of the economy develop when new technologies become
patent-eligible. For example, the biotech revolution occurred after the Supreme
Court upheld patent eligibility for living matter created by man.297 Since this
landmark decision, the biotech industry “has improved and saved lives around
the world through breakthrough medical therapies, increased crop yields, and
renewable fuels,” and the industry supports “more than 7.5 million jobs” in the
United States.298
3.

Failure to Enhance the Research Credit to Maximize Its Effectiveness

To its credit, Congress has made some limited enhancements to the research
credit in recent years. As noted earlier, Congress made the credit permanent in
2015. This was perhaps the most significant enhancement to the credit since its
enactment. Congress also recently expanded the credit for start-ups and small
businesses. Starting in 2016, some start-ups and small businesses can use the
credit to offset payroll taxes or the alternative minimum tax.
Further reforms, however, could have been considered to enhance the credit’s
effectiveness. President Obama pushed for such reforms. His administration
would have simplified the credit by repealing the outdated formula and
enhancing the credit for pass-through businesses.299 Before President Trump’s
tax plan, the TCJA, was passed, House Republicans had their own tax reform
blueprint, which promised to make the research tax credit “more effective and
efficient.”300 Despite calls for further enhancements,301 the TCJA made no
changes to the credit.
297
See Diamond v. Chakrabarty, 447 U.S. 303, 309 (1980) (“Judged in this light,
respondent’s micro-organism plainly qualifies as patentable subject matter.”).
298
BIO Celebrates 30th Anniversary of Diamond v. Chakrabarty Decision, BIOTECH.
INNOVATION ORG. (June 16, 2010), https://www.bio.org/media/press-release/bio-celebrates30th-anniversary-diamond-v-chakrabarty-decision [http://perma.cc/GZ2Q-MG9N].
299
WHITE HOUSE & U.S. DEP’T OF TREASURY, THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK FOR
BUSINESS TAX REFORM 21 (2016) [hereinafter THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK] (“The
President’s Framework would simplify the credit by repealing the outdated formula, increase
the credit rate from 14 to 18 percent, and enhance the credit for pass-through businesses.”).
300
See GOP, A BETTER WAY: OUR VISION FOR A CONFIDENT AMERICA 27 (2016),
https://www.novoco.com/sites/default/files/atoms/files/ryan_a_better_way_policy_paper_06
2416.pdf [https://perma.cc/ZAY6-MUQH] (“The Blueprint will include an R&D credit in
similar form so that America will continue to be an attractive place to conduct research. The
Committee on Ways and Means will evaluate options for making the R&D credit more
effective and efficient.”).
301
See GUENTHER, supra note 23, at 18 (“The main concern of critics is that the credit has
not been as effective as it should have because of what they say are certain problems with its
design. In their view, the credit can yield its intended benefits only if it is altered to remedy
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Congress could have increased the credit to greater than 20%, in line with
what some other nations offer. The credit in Spain and Ireland, for example, is
25%.302 It is 30% in France. Interestingly, the U.S. research credit was 25% (not
20%) when first created in 1981. Five year years later, however, Congress
reduced it to 20% to help pay for lower income tax rates as part of the Tax
Reform Act of 1986.
Congress could have expanded the types of expenditures that qualify for the
credit. The current restrictive definition of “qualified research” prevents many
research dollars from qualifying. In fact, expenses excluded from the credit
account for 27% to 50% of business R&D spending.303 A more complete and
less ambiguous definition of qualified research would also eliminate many
disputes between the IRS and taxpayers.304
Congress could have changed the nature of the credit from one that is
incremental (applicable only if the firm increases research spending over time)
to one that is volume-based (applicable simply on the volume or amount of
qualified research spending). As currently designed, the credit is not available if
a taxpayer’s gross receipts increase significantly as compared to qualified
research spending. In many countries, like the United Kingdom, the research
credit is volume-based. Indeed, some countries have recently moved from a
purely incremental credit to one that is volume-based in order to make their
credit more attractive to multinational companies with large research
activities.305
five problems in particular: (1) the credit is not a permanent provision of the IRC; (2) it still
has weak and uneven incentive effects; (3) it is not refundable; (4) the definition of qualified
research remains incomplete and ambiguous, and thus a major source of disputes between the
IRS and taxpayers; and (5) the credit is not targeted at investments that are likely to generate
relatively large economic benefits.”).
302
See, e.g., Louise Kelly, Looking to the Future: Life After the ‘Double Irish,’ INT’L TAX
REV. (Feb. 24, 2015), www.internationaltaxreview.com/Article/3430276/Looking-to-thefuture-Life-after-the-Double-Irish.html [https://perma.cc/C3XD-X94T] (“Before January 1
2015, the R&D tax credit regime [in Ireland] offered a credit of 25% on qualifying
expenditure . . . .”).
303
GUENTHER, supra note 23, at 4 (“According to some estimates, the excluded expenses
account for 27% to 50% of business R&D spending.”).
304
See id. at 18 (“[T]he definition of qualified research remains incomplete and
ambiguous, and thus [is] a major source of disputes between the IRS and taxpayers . . . .”).
305
See, e.g., Tax Reform Options: Incentives for Innovation: Hearing Before the S. Comm.
on Fin., 112th Cong. 12 (2011) (statement of Dirk Pilat, Head, Structural Policy Division,
Organization for Economic Co-operation and Development Directorate for Science,
Technology, and Industry) (“A general trend among many OECD countries has been to make
their R&D tax incentives more generous. Another has been to increase the availability and
simplicity of the use of these systems, with many countries moving towards volume-based
credits.”); PATRICK EPARVIER, THE “POLICY MIX” PROJECT: COUNTRY REVIEW FRANCE 19
(2007), http://ec.europa.eu/invest-in-research/pdf/download_en/france.pdf [https://perma.cc
/46Y5-NG8M] (“In order to increase companies’ expenditures devoted to R&D, the
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Finally, Congress could have made the credit refundable, as it is in some other
countries. Currently, the credit is non-refundable, which means that only firms
with sufficient income tax liabilities can benefit from the full amount of the
credit claimed in any year. This can pose a problem for small, research-intensive
firms that spend substantial sums on research in early years while operating with
a stream of net-operating losses. In the view of some critics, the non-refundable
credit is “likely to reduce the typical small, research-intensive start-up firm’s
prospects of survival and growth, as the firm cannot count on having access to
the credit when the need for it is greatest.”306
4.

Failure to Enact a U.S. Patent Box

While Congress failed to enhance the only front-end tax incentive left for
innovation (the incremental research credit), it also failed to consider adoption
of a patent box as a new back-end incentive. Many European countries in recent
years have enacted so-called “innovation boxes” or “patent boxes” to encourage
multinational companies to move their intellectual property and innovation
activities within their borders.307 Patent boxes provide a reduced effective tax

Government has reformed the Research Tax Credit in 2004. The most important change is the
introduction of a volume-based scheme along the incremental-based scheme (that started in
the 1980s).”); ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., R&D TAX INCENTIVES: FRANCE, 2018,
at 1 (2019), https://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats-france.pdf [https://perma.cc/HHD4-3DC7]
(noting that France utilizes volume-based research tax credit); P RICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS,
GLOBAL RESEARCH & DEVELOPMENT INCENTIVES GROUP 19 (2012), www.pwc.com/gx/en/tax
/assets/pwc-global-research-development-incentives-group-november-2012-pdf.pdf [https:
//perma.cc/V69D-SRZ6] (charting countries with incremental- or volume-based credits);
Kelly, supra note 302 (“The availability of grant aid for certain R&D projects, in addition to
the R&D tax credit, has led to a significant increase in the number of R&D centres in Ireland
in recent years.”).
306
GUENTHER, supra note 23, at 19.
307
See Jason M. Brown, Note, Patent Box Taxation: A Comparison of Four Recent
European Patent Box Tax Regimes and an Analytical Consideration of If and How the United
States Should Implement Its Own Patent Box, 46 INT’L LAW. 913, 914 (2012) (“Since 2007,
several European and Asian governments, including Belgium, China, France, Luxembourg,
the Netherlands, and Spain, have added some form of patent box taxation to their corporate
tax systems.”).
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rate on income associated with eligible intellectual property. 308 China has also
recently jumped on the patent-box bandwagon.309
Countries adopt patent box regimes for various reasons. Some use them to try
to lure companies to relocate their existing mobile intellectual property and to
capture additional tax revenues.310 Some wish to improve the competitiveness
of their own tax systems and discourage shifting intellectual property income
abroad.311 And some adopt them to attract research activities, along with all the
positive spillover benefits, within their borders.312
Despite widespread adoption of patent boxes in Europe and China, the United
States has failed to take the initiative to create its own. There have been calls for
a patent box. In 2011, for example, David Camp, then-Chairman of the House
Committee on Ways and Means, proposed a 15% rate on certain intellectual
property income.313 In 2015, Representatives Charles Boustany and Richard
308

Some patent box regimes exempt income (royalty income, and, in some cases, gains
from disposal) from qualifying intellectual property, which has the effect of reducing the
effective corporate tax rate on that intellectual property. In contrast, some patent box regimes
allow certain income from qualifying intellectual property to be taxed at reduced rates. See
id. at 916 (comparing four patent box regimes); see also NICK PANTALEO, FINN POSCHMANN
& SCOTT WILKIE, C.D. HOWE INST., COMMENTARY NO. 379: IMPROVING THE TAX TREATMENT
OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY INCOME IN CANADA 11 (2013), https://www.cdhowe.org/sites
/default/files/attachments/research_papers/mixed/Commentary_379_0.pdf [https://perma.cc
/CX7R-7GBT] (proposing patent box regime in Canada).
309
See W. Wesley Hill & J. Sims Rhyne, III, Opening Pandora’s Patent Box: Global
Intellectual Property Tax Incentives and Their Implications for the United States, 53 IDEA
371, 384 (2013) (“In addition to these incentives, China adopted a patent box regime in
2008.”).
310
Graetz & Doud, supra note 22, at 405 (“Patent boxes are of more recent vintage and
not only take international developments into account, but seem to have been enacted by
various European nations in an effort to capture a share of mobile innovative activity or at
least some revenue from such especially mobile income.”).
311
The United Kingdom noted that “some patent-rich UK businesses face a higher overall
effective tax rate than their foreign competitors,” and the patent box is explicitly intended to
“improve the competitiveness of the UK corporate tax regime . . . .” HM TREASURY,
CORPORATE TAX REFORM: DELIVERING A MORE COMPETITIVE SYSTEM 51 (2010),
https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_dat
a/file/81303/corporate_tax_reform_complete_document.pdf [https://perma.cc/8SYP-BVX5].
The UK patent box also appears to be at least partially a response to the plans of some
prominent multinational entities to move to Ireland. See Lee A. Sheppard, What Hath Britain
Wrought?, 61 TAX NOTES INT’L 7, 7-8 (2011).
312
See, e.g., Finance Act 2012, c. 14, sch. 2 (Eng.), www.legislation.gov.uk/ukpga/2012
/14/contents/enacted [https://perma.cc/9NTK-MUJZ] (providing reduced corporation tax rate
for profits from patents).
313
See H. COMM. ON WAYS & MEANS, TECHNICAL EXPLANATIONS OF THE WAYS AND
MEANS DISCUSSION DRAFT PROVISIONS TO ESTABLISH A PARTICIPATION EXEMPTION SYSTEM
FOR THE TAXATION OF FOREIGN INCOME 34 (2011).
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Neal offered a patent box proposal that allowed (by means of a 71.4% deduction)
a 10% U.S. tax rate for certain intellectual property income that has a U.S.
link.314 But none of these calls have been answered with new legislation.
There are several reasons why the United States resists adopting a patent box.
First, patent boxes provide tax benefits for intellectual property already in
existence, and research suggests they are less effective than R&D credits in
encouraging new innovation.315 R&D deductions and credits do a better job of
encouraging new research, which results in positive spillover effects like
attracting high value workers as well as luring capital essential for intellectual
property.316 Second, patent boxes are costly.317 The United Kingdom, for
example, saw a reduction in corporate revenues with its patent box even though
additional innovation was reported.318 If the United States adopted a patent box,
the large size of its market could constitute a significant loss of revenue.319
Third, patent boxes require new rules and compliance checks that would only
further complicate the tax system.320 And finally, patent boxes can result in a
314

See Peter R. Merrill et al., Is It Time for the United States to Consider the Patent Box?,
134 TAX NOTES 1665, 1665 (2012) (“Given the tax benefits provided in some EU countries
for holding IP, the question arises whether the United States should adopt similar incentives
and, if so, how they should be designed.”); Martin A. Sullivan, Economic Analysis: Time for
a U.S. Patent Box?, 133 TAX NOTES 1304, 1307 (2011) (“If the United States wants to further
promote private domestic research, it would be far simpler and more cost-effective to expand
the research credit than to add a patent box to the code.”); ERNST & YOUNG, US
REPRESENTATIVES BOUSTANY AND NEIL RELEASE INNOVATION BOX DRAFT AS PART OF
INTERNATIONAL TAX REFORM DELIBERATIONS 1 (2015), http://www.ey.com/Publication
/vwLUAssets/US_Representatives_Boustany_and_Neal_release_innovation_box_draft_as_
part_of_international_tax_reform_deliberations/$FILE/2015G_CM5649_US%20Reps%20B
oustany%20and%20Neal%20release%20innovation%20box%20draft%20as%20part%20of
%20intl%20tax%20reform%20delibs.pdf [https://perma.cc/Y95Y-56AK] (“On 29 July 2015,
US Senior House Ways and Means Committee members Charles Boustany and Richard Neal
released an ‘innovation box’ discussion draft that proposes a 10.15% effective rate of
corporate tax on a portion of US corporate profits derived from qualifying intellectual
property . . . .”).
315
THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK, supra note 299, at 22.
316
See Graetz & Doud, supra note 22, at 374-75 (summarizing data on benefits of R&D
tax incentives); see also THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK, supra note 299, at 22 (“Compared to
the R&E credit, an innovation box is less effective in encouraging innovation.”).
317
THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK, supra note 299, at 22.
318
Rachel Griffith, Helen Miller & Martin O’Connell, Ownership of Intellectual Property
and Corporate Taxation, 112 J. PUB. ECON. 12, 21 (2014).
319
A way to make up the tax revenue loss would have to be considered. See Luca GattoniCelli, News and Analysis: Ryan Eyeing Research Cost Recovery to Pay for Innovation Box,
148 TAX NOTES 824, 824 (2015) (describing House Ways and Means Committee Chair Paul
Ryan’s proposal of five-year amortization of R&D costs).
320
THE PRESIDENT’S FRAMEWORK, supra note 299, at 22 (“Innovation boxes also work
against the broadly shared goal of simplifying the tax system. New tax rules and compliance
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“race to the bottom” wherein countries compete to have the lowest rate on
intellectual property income.321 This could have a negative impact on overall
government funding and provision of various goods and services.
Despite these plausible reasons for failing to adopt a patent box, the United
States cannot ignore the fact that competitor countries are utilizing them as tools
to compete for global innovation. Belgium (6.8%), Cyprus (2.5%), Ireland
(6.25%), Liechtenstein (2.5%), Luxembourg (5.76%), Malta (0%), and the
Netherlands (5%) are just a few of the countries offering very low effective rates
on income from innovation.322 Even in China, the applicable tax rate on
qualifying profits ranges from 0 to 12.5%.323
5.

Base Erosion Measures in Response to Intellectual Property Income
Shifting

We have explored several recent deliberate domestic tax changes that impact
innovation, namely the choice to (1) repeal expensing for R&D, (2) repeal
capital gains treatment for certain innovators, (3) not enhance the research tax
credit, and (4) not adopt a U.S. patent box. It is worthy to note that Congress
made other changes to the Code that may have unintended consequences for
innovation. For example, the TCJA enacted an excise tax on the net investment
income of certain private colleges and universities. 324 The tax applies not only
to interest and dividends, but also to royalties. 325 The new tax may have the
effect of reducing the value of endowments and redirecting money that could be
used for basic research from those institutions to the federal government.
Perhaps the most significant changes made by the TCJA were to U.S.
international tax rules. For years, Congress has explored ways to ensure its fair
share of tax revenues from innovation conducted in the United States but
exploited abroad. While many U.S. multinational entities presently conduct a
vast amount of research in the United States and claim credits for R&D
spending, the vast amount of worldwide profits attributable to that research is

checks would be needed to determine precisely how much income was associated with
particular innovations.”).
321
Id. (“In essence, an innovation box is just another variation on a ‘race to the bottom’ in
the taxation of multinational firms, where countries compete to have the lowest tax rate on
certain corporate activities, without concern for the funding of necessary public goods and
services.”).
322
JEFFREY A. MAINE & XUAN-THAO NGUYEN, THE INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY HOLDING
COMPANY: TAX USE AND ABUSE FROM VICTORIA’S SECRET TO APPLE 173 (2017); see also
PANTALEO, POSCHMANN & WILKIE, supra note 308, at 9-11; Merrill et al., supra note 314;
Brown, supra note 307, at 927.
323
Hill & Rhyne, supra note 309, at 385.
324
I.R.C. § 4968 (2012) (imposing tax on applicable educational institutions).
325
See id. § 4940(c) (defining net investment income).
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not taxed in the United States.326 As an example, Microsoft spent over $7.8
billion (out of a total R&D budget of $9.1 billion) on R&D in the United States
and received $200 million in U.S. tax credits. Much of their profit attributable
to the research conducted in the United States, however, was located in low-tax
foreign countries.327
The TCJA made several changes to U.S. international income taxation
intended to encourage U.S. businesses to report and pay income taxes in the
United States rather than use foreign subsidiaries to lodge their earnings
elsewhere. The problem with some of these anti-base erosion measures is that,
while designed to capture more tax revenues, they may actually encourage the
movement of R&D (and related income) offshore.328
As one example, the TCJA adopted a minimum tax on global intangible lowtaxed income (“GILTI”).329 This subjects a new, very broad class of foreign
intellectual property income, GILTI, to immediate taxation, albeit at a reduced
rate. The computation of the new tax is complicated, but essentially it is imposed
on the excess of a controlled foreign corporation’s net income over a deemed
return on the controlled foreign corporation’s tangible assets (10% of
depreciated tax basis). According to some analysts, firms will have an incentive
to move tangible assets (such as R&D facilities and operations) abroad in order
to reduce GILTI.330
As a complement to the new minimum tax regime on excess returns earned
by a controlled foreign corporation, the TCJA provides a low effective tax rate
on excess returns earned directly by a U.S. company from foreign sales
(including licenses from intangibles in the United States).331 The preferential
rate on foreign-derived intangible income (“FDII”) was designed to encourage
companies to locate their intangibles in the United States. According to some
analysts, however, “FDII is not likely to encourage firms to move their

326

See, e.g., MAINE & NGUYEN, supra note 322, at 3 (“This book closely examines these
tax minimization strategies—specifically the use of domestic and foreign IP Holding
Companies.”).
327
See Offshore Profit Shifting and the U.S. Tax Code—Part I (Microsoft and HewlettPackard): Hearing Before the Permanent Subcomm. on Investigations of the S. Comm. on
Homeland Sec. and Governmental Affairs, 112th Cong. 20 (2012) (discussing Microsoft’s
activities in low-tax jurisdictions).
328
For instance, the TCJA reduced the corporate tax rate from 35% to 21% and moved the
United States closer to a territorial tax regime. While the rate reduction may reduce incentives
for multinationals to shift profits outside the United States, the shift to a territorial system
could actually exacerbate those incentives because any profits shifted offshore would be
permanently exempt from U.S. tax.
329
I.R.C. § 951A (2012) (adopting tax on GILTI).
330
See Alexander Lewis, TCJA’s Effect on Income Shifting to Be Determined, Economists
Say, 89 TAX NOTES INT’L 665, 665 (2018).
331
I.R.C. § 250 (2012) (addressing FDII and GILTI).
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intangible assets back to the United States because of the uncertainty
surrounding the validity of the regime under international trade rules.”332
Base erosion due to intellectual property income shifting has not been merely
a U.S. concern. Statistical and anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign-based
multinationals engage in the same income-shifting strategies as U.S.-based
multinationals.333 In 2015, the OECD delivered a number of concrete
recommendations to help nations address the problems of offshore income
shifting, including recommendations involving intellectual property. 334 The socalled Base Erosion and Profit Shifting (“BEPS”) Project consists of fifteen
actions that provide principles (minimum standards) for appropriate taxation of
multinational companies that attempt to tax profits where value is added (and to
promote greater tax transparency with increased information exchange between
tax authorities).335 Most importantly, many of the actions attempt to tax income
in the source country as opposed to the country of residence.336 Action 5 targets
patent box regimes. Because patent boxes can “unfairly erode the tax bases of
other countries, potentially distorting the location of capital and services,” 337
especially when they are offered to entities that engage in no substantial activity,
Action 5 requires “substantial activity” by a multinational company in order for
the multinational to benefit from the patent box’s lower rate on intellectual

332

See Lewis, supra note 330, at 665.
ROSANNE ALTSHULER, STEPHEN SHAY & ERIC TODER, LESSONS THE UNITED STATES
CAN LEARN FROM OTHER COUNTRIES’ TERRITORIAL SYSTEMS FOR TAXING INCOME OF
MULTINATIONAL CORPORATIONS 36 (2015), https://www.taxpolicycenter.org/publications
/lessons-united-states-can-learn-other-countries-territorial-systems-taxing-income/full
[https://perma.cc/77AJ-MTU8] (“Anecdotal evidence suggests that foreign-based
multinationals may be engaging in similar transactions and perhaps even to a greater
degree.”).
334
See generally ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., OECD/G20 BASE EROSION AND
PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: EXPLANATORY STATEMENT (2015), http://www.oecd.org/ctp/bepsexplanatory-statement-2015.pdf [https://perma.cc/7PXB-8BGY] (providing action items for
tax reform).
335
The U.S. Tax Code: Love It, Leave It, or Reform It: Hearing Before the S. Comm. on
Fin., 113th Cong. 97 (2014) (testimony of Robert B. Stack, Deputy Assistant Secretary
(International Tax Affairs), United States Department of the Treasury) (“The principal target
of the BEPS project is so-called ‘stateless income,’ basically very low- or non-taxed income
within a multinational group.”).
336
See H. David Rosenbloom & Joseph P. Brothers, Reflections on the Intersection of U.S.
Tax Treaty Policy, U.S. Tax Reform, and BEPS, 78 TAX NOTES INT’L 759, 764 (2015)
(“[M]any of the [BEPS] actions point clearly in the direction of greater source-basis
taxation.”).
337
ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., COUNTERING HARMFUL TAX PRACTICES MORE
EFFECTIVELY, TAKING INTO ACCOUNT TRANSPARENCY AND SUBSTANCE 13 (2014),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/9789264218970-en.pdf
[https://perma.cc/TSN6UFYP].
333

2019]

ATTACKING INNOVATION

1749

property income.338 It uses R&D expenditures as a proxy for substantial activity.
Thus, there must be a link or appropriate nexus between a multinational
company’s research expenditures and the intellectual property income receiving
the low rate. If a multinational incurred 100% of the costs to develop an
intellectual property asset in a country with a patent box regime, then 100% of
the overall income from the intellectual property asset would be eligible for the
regime’s preferential rate. However, if the multinational outsourced all R&D to
related parties, then none of the income from the intellectual property asset
would receive tax benefits.
The point to take from all of this is that many countries have revised their
patent boxes to meet the nexus requirement.339 These BEPS-compliant measures
by nations with a patent box may have negative implications for the United
States, as there will now be an incentive for firms to move their research
activities offshore in order to take advantage of the lower patent box tax rates.
There are other examples of OECD initiatives that will have an indirect effect
on the design and implementation of nations’ R&D incentives, which, in turn,
may result in multinationals relocating their R&D functions to low-tax countries
to which they attribute profits.340
III. IMPLICATIONS
Startups, typically defined as companies less than ten years old, are critical to
economic growth in the United States, as they constitute 51% of firms engaged
in innovation.341 Technology-based startups are particularly important, as they
account for more than 70% of business R&D investment and nearly 60% of
R&D jobs in the United States.342 Technology-based startups focus on
innovation development with competitive market advantages and have high
338

Id. at 9.
See, e.g., NGUYEN & MAINE, supra note 322, at 278 & n.184 (noting that “[m]embers’
countries will have to revise their patent boxes to meet the nexus requirement, which can limit
the objectives they were designed to achieve”).
340
A prime example is the OECD’s guidance with respect to transfer pricing rules. Under
the OECD’s revised transfer pricing guidelines, a controlled foreign subsidiary must perform
actual functions and assume risks related to the development, maintenance, and exploitation
of intangibles in order to be entitled to a return (allocated more global profits) taxed at the
country’s low rate. See ORG. FOR ECON. COOPERATION & DEV., OECD/G20 BASE EROSION
AND PROFIT SHIFTING PROJECT: 2015 FINAL REPORTS: EXECUTIVE SUMMARIES 28-29 (2015),
www.oecd.org/ctp/beps-reports-2015-executive-summaries.pdf
[https://perma.cc/VL57BA9V] (discussing risks and intangibles).
341
See J. JOHN WU & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, INFO. TECH. & INNOVATION FOUND., HOW
TECHNOLOGY-BASED START-UPS SUPPORT U.S. ECONOMIC GROWTH 5-12 (2017),
http://www2.itif.org/2017-technology-based-start-ups.pdf?_ga
[https://perma.cc/D6G2QXLH].
342
See id. at 6 (focusing on ten technology-based industries in manufacturing and
services).
339
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growth potential compared to other types of startups.343 When the tech startups
succeed, their innovations and business model translate to an increase in
employment and revenue.344 Employment growth rates at tech startups enjoy
twice as many net jobs as all startups generally.345 Workers in tech startups earn
twice the national average compensation and almost three times more than other
types of startups.346 Moreover, technology-based startups create jobs in other
economic sectors, such as jobs in firms that are conducting business with the
tech startups.347 Further, for every job created directly by technology-based
startups, five additional jobs are created in other sectors—the highest
employment multiplier.348 Clearly, startups bring significant changes in many
industries and impact society. The number of new startups in the United States,
however, has been declining rapidly in recent years—a drop by 30% over the
past ten years.349
We have offered several reasons to explain this downward trend for
technology-based startups. By closing the patent protection doors on inventions
in fields dominated by startups—like software, business methods, medical
343

Id. at 7 (“[Tech start-ups] often experience accounting losses for several years because
they undertake heavy initial R&D and prototyping and testing investments, often many years
before developing a significant revenue stream. Many fail somewhere along this process, but
if their technology and business models succeed, they often experience robust growth rates,
hiring skilled and semi-skilled workers and paying well above the median wage. This
contrasts with the typical new business in other industries, such as a restaurant or local service
firm, which does not invest in R&D, has little intention to grow, creates a small number of
jobs often at low wages, and usually goes out of business in under 10 years.” (footnote
omitted)).
344
Id.
345
See generally IAN HATHAWAY, EWING MARION KAUFFMAN FOUND., TECH STARTS:
HIGH-TECHNOLOGY BUSINESS FORMATION AND JOB CREATION IN THE UNITED STATES (2013),
https://www.kauffman.org/-/media/kauffman_org/research-reports-and-covers/2013/08
/bdstechstartsreport.pdf [https://perma.cc/D3QN-QZSB].
346
See WU & ATKINSON, supra note 341, at 10 (“[T]echnology-based start-ups pay an
average of $102,000, more than double the U.S. average wage of $48,000.”).
347
These related jobs include “manufacturing jobs in production supply chains, laboratory
technicians in third-party laboratories, hospital workers where biotech firms conduct trails
[sic], and lawyers and accountants that help firms.” Id. at 10. Likewise, indirectly induced
jobs include jobs in groceries, financial services, and entertainment that the tech employees
frequent. Id.
348
See, e.g., MASS. BIOTECH. COUNCIL, PRESIDENT OBAMA, THE 111TH CONGRESS, AND
BIOTECHNOLOGY: WORKING TOGETHER TODAY TO ENSURE A HEALTHY TOMORROW 16 (2009)
(“For every biopharmaceutical manufacturing job created, 5 additional supporting jobs are
created in other industries.”); ENRICO MORETTI, THE NEW GEOGRAPHY OF JOBS 13 (2012)
(“Indeed, my research shows that for each new high-tech job in a city, five additional jobs are
ultimately created outside of the high-tech sector in that city, both in skilled occupations
(lawyers, teachers, nurses) and in unskilled ones (waiters, hairdressers, carpenters).”).
349
See supra note 1 and accompanying text.
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diagnostics, and personalized medicine—the United States has been heading
into unknown territory. Because Europe and China recognize the importance of
innovations in these fields and allow them patent eligibility, companies seek
patent protection there.350 This results in Europe and China enjoying increased
financing and employment in those sectors. Likewise, the decline in U.S.
government funding for basic research deprives the United States of scientific
breakthroughs, decimates the number of researchers, and discourages young
people from entering STEM fields. Stronger patent protection in Europe and
China coupled with the lack of U.S. government funding for research will force
innovation to leave the United States for other locations. The offshore movement
of talent and investments will have devastating consequences in the long run.
U.S. tax policy has also played a major factor in the decline of American
innovation. The U.S. tax policy tools used to incentivize innovation (for
example, a tax deduction and credit for R&D and capital gains treatment upon
innovation dispositions) have remained largely constant until recently with the
TCJA; if anything, their design changes over the years have weakened their
incentive effects. Meanwhile, other countries have enhanced their tax incentives
for innovation over time. Tax considerations can be important when firms are
setting their annual research budgets, deciding what research projects to
undertake, and determining where to undertake them. Many countries
understand this and have adopted very attractive tax incentives for innovation.
And some, even shortly after adopting tax incentives, have modified them to
make them more attractive. The United Kingdom, for example, started with a
super deduction for small companies. It later created a super deduction for larger
companies and then increased the super deduction for both small and large
companies, resulting in several increases to tax deductions for innovation.351
Some countries have enhanced their tax credits for innovation. Ireland did so
from 20% to 25%. France’s change from an incremental credit to a volumebased credit is another example.352 Further, many countries, including China,
have enacted patent boxes or innovation boxes.
350

Madigan & Mossoff, supra note 13, at 941 (“Other jurisdictions, such as in Europe and
China, are now granting patents for the same or related inventions and discoveries that are
being rejected in the U.S. as ineligible for patent protection.”); Gabriela I. Coman, Procuring
Personalized Medicine Patents in US vs. Europe, LAW360 (July 20, 2015, 9:56 AM),
https://www.law360.com/articles/677723/procuring-personalized-medicine-patents-in-usvs-europe (“[C]urrent U.S. and European patent laws do not provide a uniform platform when
addressing personalized medicine claims. In the United States, many patent claims related to
personalized medicine are being challenged based on patentable subject matter, whereas in
Europe, most claims are questioned based on novelty and inventive step.”).
351
See PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 305, at 23 (describing United Kingdom’s
“super deduction”).
352
See ORG. FOR ECON. CO-OPERATION & DEV., supra note 305, at 1;
PRICEWATERHOUSECOOPERS, supra note 305, at 13 (describing French system as credit on
volume).
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As a result of other nations enhancing their R&D tax incentives, the United
States has dropped significantly in its ranking among nations in terms of
innovation tax incentives. The OECD monitors tax support for R&D and
innovation among member countries. As the following chart shows, in terms of
R&D tax incentive generosity, the United States dropped from number one in
1990 to number twenty-five in 2016.353
Figure 1. U.S. Ranking in OECD on R&D Tax Incentive Generosity for
Large Firms.

In light of this trend, one might have expected the United States to adopt in
the TCJA of 2017 new tax policy approaches to spur innovation, including
measures adopted by other nations. Instead of enhancing incentives for
353

See LUKE A. STEWART, JACEK WARDA & ROBERT D. ATKINSON, WE’RE #27!: THE
UNITED STATES LAGS FAR BEHIND IN R&D TAX INCENTIVE GENEROSITY 1 (2012),
http://www2.itif.org/2012-were-27-b-index-tax.pdf?_ga
[https://perma.cc/S2XW-AG8E]
(“In 2012, the United States ranks just 27th out of 42 countries studied in terms of R&D tax
incentive generosity, down from 23rd just five years ago.”); Jacek Warda, Measuring the
Value of R&D Tax Treatment in OECD Countries, 2000 SCI. TECH. & INDUSTRY REV., no. 2,
2002, at 185, 199 (listing United States as moderate incentive provider in 1999-2000); Jacek
Warda, Tax Treatment of Business Investments in Intellectual Assets: An International
Comparison 27 (OECD Sci., Tech. and Indus., Working Paper No. 2006/04, 2006),
https://www.oecd-ilibrary.org/docserver/672304513676.pdf [https://perma.cc/K2SQ-ZN5T]
(comparing corporate income tax rates); Measuring Tax Support for R&D and Innovation,
OECD, http://www.oecd.org/sti/rd-tax-stats.htm [https://perma.cc/ESD4-Z2CF] (last visited
Aug. 22, 2019) (charting direct government funding and tax support for business R&D by
country). In certain years, values were not conducted for some OECD countries. For example,
in 2012, Estonia and Latvia were omitted, and the 2016 estimates did not calculate values for
Estonia and Israel.
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innovation, however, the TCJA actually scaled back incentives for innovation
while providing enhanced tax breaks for machinery and enacting anti-base
erosion measures to capture revenue from foreign intangible income.
Because the TCJA is the most recent attack on innovation, we give it a little
more attention in our final observations.
First, the U.S. government did not have any quantitative sense of the real
effects of some of these tax changes before adopting them. We have seen this
before in the United States. The initial research tax credit in 1981 was 25% (not
20%). However, “[t]here is no evidence that the rate was chosen on the basis of
a rigorous assessment of the gap between the private and social returns to
research investment, or the sensitivity of research expenditures to declines in
their after-tax cost.”354 In 1986, the credit was reduced to 20%. Again, this
change was not based on an analysis of the credit’s effectiveness in the first five
years, but rather seemed to stem from the overriding goals of the Tax Reform
Act of 1986, which were to lower tax rates and broaden the income tax base.
History seems to repeat itself. The TCJA eliminated expensing and capital gains
treatment for innovation not based on an analysis of these incentives’
effectiveness, but rather based on the overriding goals of the TCJA—reducing
tax rates and broadening the income tax base. This is not the best way to set
innovation tax policy.355
Second, the TCJA’s reliance on tax incentives for tangible asset purchases
(machinery and equipment) to boost the economy is short-sighted. Despite the
political mantra that full and immediate expensing of tangible assets is the best
way to expand the economy, econometric analysis reveals only a short-term
increase in private investment in tangible property in response to these
incentives.356 Firms may accelerate their investments, but they do not change
their aggregate investment in tangible assets over time.357 A more long-term
354

GUENTHER, supra note 23, at 11.
But we have seen it in the United States and in other countries as well. As a prime
example, many countries have adopted patent boxes in the absence of convincing evidence of
their effectiveness. One would think that nations would want some quantitative sense of a
patent box’s effects before adopting one. But that has not been the case. The data is too limited
to adequately assess the effectiveness of patent boxes. Nevertheless, many countries have
rapidly adopted them, and many have expanded and enhanced them soon after adoption
without evidence of their effectiveness.
356
Kevin A. Hassett & R. Glenn Hubbard, Tax Policy and Business Investment, 3
HANDBOOK PUB. ECON. 1293, 1338 (2002); see generally Kevin A. Hassett & Kathryn
Newmark, Taxation and Business Behavior: A Review of the Recent Literature, in
FUNDAMENTAL TAX REFORM 1294 (John W. Diamond & George R. Zodrow eds., 2008).
357
See generally Eric Zwick & James Mahon, Do Financial Frictions Amplify Fiscal
Policy? Evidence from Business Investment Stimulus (June 30, 2014) (unpublished
manuscript) (available at https://www.irs.gov/pub/irs-soi/businessinveststimmahonzwick.pdf
[https://perma.cc/B5QE-LPLX]). The evidence on whether expensing results in permanent
increases in aggregate investment is more mixed. See, e.g., James R. Hines, Jr. & Jongsang
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focus on economic expansion would focus more on innovation and intangible
capital investments rather than on tangible capital investments.
Third, and most significantly, the recent tax changes will encourage firms to
move their R&D offshore. The research credit, untouched by the recent TCJA,
is now the U.S. government’s main tax policy tool to spur innovation. However,
relying on the current, unenhanced research credit as the main tax policy tool for
innovation does not place the United States in a competitive posture vis-à-vis
other nations. The result is a risk of losing American innovation to other
countries, including China. Research and development have become more
global over the past two decades as more countries have developed the technical
talent to conduct research and as firms operate in more markets around the
world. Studies show that innovation tax incentives clearly affect the location of
research activities and not just the amount.358
The offshoring of innovation is already happening. A review of seven
industrial groups in twelve countries concluded that U.S. technological
dominance is eroding at a rapid pace and that foreign affiliates of U.S. firms
conducted more research in countries with research tax incentives. In 2007, U.S.
foreign affiliate R&D was $17.2 billion, or equivalent to 11% of the U.S.
business total; just ten years later, in 2017, it was $41 billion, or equivalent to
15% of the U.S. total.359 This trajectory of foreign affiliate research performed
outside the United States is getting worse and will likely only continue to worsen
in the aftermath of Congress’s recent tax law changes.
CONCLUSION
Innovation helps firms in the United States stay ahead of their international
competitors, producing higher market shares and more revenues with which to
hire more workers. A strong patent system and strong tax incentives can affect
where a firm places its highest-value production activities. Innovation expansion
domestically has carry-over effects because innovations lower costs and increase
competitiveness in other industries. Advances in information technology, for
Park, Investment Ramifications of Distortionary Tax Subsidies, 172 J. PUB. ECON 36, 48
(2019) (concluding that evidence of positive impact of any tax incentives on aggregate
investment is relatively weak).
358
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EXPANDING THE R&D TAX CREDIT IS KEY TO SUCCESSFUL CORPORATE TAX REFORM 4 (2017),
http://www2.itif.org/2017-rd-tax-credit.pdf [https://perma.cc/N68Z-N85N] (“A multicountry study showed that R&D in one country responds to changes in the price of R&D in
other countries, suggesting that innovation policies could play an important role in
determining where research is located globally.” (citing Nicholas Bloom & Rachel Griffith,
The Internationalisation of UK R&D, 22 FISCAL STUD. 337, 350 (2001))).
359
Research and Development: U.S. Trends and International Comparisons, NAT’L SCI.
BOARD, https://www.nsf.gov/statistics/2018/nsb20181/report/sections/research-and-develop
ment-u-s-trends-and-international-comparisons/u-s-business-r-d#r-d-by-multinationalenterprises [https://perma.cc/3LQM-TAMC] (last visited Aug. 22, 2019).
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instance, can affect productivity throughout the traded sector. The higher wages
and lower prices that eventually result from higher productivity create a new
source of demand across the economy.
Until now, the United States has been the largest research performer ($457
billion in 2013), accounting for 27% of the global total. But China is not far
behind. China was the second largest performer ($336 billion in 2013),
accounting for 20% of the global total.360 China and other developing countries
have vigorously pursued national innovation policies. The United States can no
longer afford to take an “exceptionalism” approach to patent law and tax policy
and ignore the policies of other nations.

360
Japan is third at 10% ($160 billion); Germany is fourth at 6% ($101 billion). Id. France
($55 billion), India ($36 billion), Russia ($41 billion), South Korea ($69 billion), and the
United Kingdom ($40 billion) make up a third tier of performers, each accounting for 2% to
4% of the global total. Id. Australia, Brazil, Canada, Italy, Spain, and Taiwan make up a fourth
tier, with annual R&D expenditures ranging from $19 billion to $31 billion; each accounting
for 1% to 2% of the global total. Id.

